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1 Introduction
Standard models in many elds of economics posit the existence of a representative household in
either a static or a dynamic setting, and then seek to relate the households welfare to observable
aggregate data. A separate large literature examines the productivity residual dened by Solow
(1957), and interprets it as a measure of technical change or policy e¤ectiveness. Yet a third
literature, often termed "development accounting," studies productivity di¤erences across countries,
and interprets them as measures of technology gaps or institutional quality. To our knowledge,
no one has suggested that these three literatures are intimately related. We show that they are.
Starting from the standard framework of a representative household that maximizes intertemporal
welfare over an innite horizon, we derive methods for comparing economic well-being over time
and across countries. Our results show that under a wide range of assumptions, welfare can be
measured using just two variables, productivity and capital accumulation. We take our framework
to the data, and measure welfare change within countries and welfare di¤erences across countries.
In the simplest case of a closed economy with no distortionary taxes we show that to a rst-
order approximation the welfare change of a representative household can be fully characterized
by three objects: the expected present discounted value of total factor productivity (TFP) growth
as dened by Solow, the change in expectations of the level of TFP, and the growth in the stock
of capital per person. The result sounds similar to one that is often proven in the context of a
competitive optimal growth model, which might lead one to ask what assumptions on technology
and product market competition are required to obtain this result. The answer is, None. The
result holds for all types of technology and market behavior, as long as consumers take prices
as given and are not constrained in the amount they can buy or sell at those prices. Thus, for
example, the same result holds whether the TFP growth is generated by exogenous technological
change, as in the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model or is the result of spillovers or prot-maximizing
investment in R&D as in endogenous growth models. Aggregate TFP can also change without any
change in production technology in models with heterogeneous distortions, and our results imply
that an increase in aggregate TFP due to reallocation would be as much of a welfare gain for the
representative consumer as a change in technology with the same magnitude and persistence.
Our ndings suggest a very di¤erent interpretation of TFP from the usual one. Usually one
argues that TFP growth is interesting because it provides information on the change or di¤usion of
technology, or measures improvement in institutional quality, the returns to scale in the production
function, or the markup of price over marginal cost. We show that whether all or none of these
things is true, TFP is interesting for a very di¤erent reason. Using only the rst-order conditions
for optimization of the representative household, we can show that TFP is key to measuring welfare
changes within a country and welfare di¤erences across countries. We interpret TFP purely from
the household side, producing what one might call the household-centric Solow residual.1 Here
we follow the intuition of Basu and Fernald (2002), and supply a general proof of their basic insight
1The term is due to Miles Kimball.
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that TFP, calculated from the point of view of the consumer, is relevant for welfare.
The intuition for our result comes from noting that TFP growth is output growth minus share-
weighted input growth. The representative household receives all output, which ceteris paribus
increases its welfare. But it also supplies some inputs: labor input, which reduces leisure, and
capital input, which involves deferring consumption (and perhaps losing some capital to deprecia-
tion). The household measures the cost of the inputs supplied relative to the output gained by real
factor pricesthe real wage and the real rental rate of capital. TFP also subtracts inputs supplied
from output gained, and uses exactly the same prices to construct the input shares. The welfare
result holds in a very general setting because relative prices measure the consumers marginal rate
of substitution even in many situations when they do not measure the economys marginal rate of
transformation e.g., if there are externalities, increasing returns or imperfect competition.
This intuition suggests that in cases where prices faced by households di¤er from those facing
rms, it is the former that matter for welfare. We show that this intuition is correct, and here
our household-centric Solow residual substantially di¤ers from Solows original measure, which uses
the prices faced by rms. Proportional taxes are an important source of price wedges in actual
economies. We show that the shares in the household-centric Solow residual need to be constructed
using the factor prices faced by households. Since marginal income tax rates and rates of value-
added taxation can be substantial, especially in rich countries, this modication is quantitatively
important, as we show in empirical implementations of our results. We also extend our framework
to allow for the provision of public goods and services.
We then move to showing analogous results for open economies. Our previous results need to
be modied substantially if we construct TFP using the standard output measure, real GDP. To
the three terms discussed above we need to add the present discounted value of expected changes
in the terms of trade, the present discounted value of expected changes in the rate of return on
foreign assets, and the growth rate of net foreign asset holdings. Intuitively, the rst two of
these additional terms a¤ect the consumers ability to obtain welfare-relevant consumption and
investment for a given level of factor supply. Holdings of net foreign assets are analogous to
domestic physical capital in that both can be transformed into consumption at a future date.
While these results connect to and extend the existing literature, as we discuss below, they are
di¢ cult to take to the data. It is very hard to get good measures of changes in asset holdings by
country for a large sample of countries.2 Furthermore, measuring asset returns in a comparable way
across countries would require us to adjust for di¤erences in the risk of country portfolios, which is
a formidable undertaking. Fortunately, these di¢ culties disappear if we use real absorption rather
than GDP as the measure of output.3 In this case, exactly the same three terms that summarize
welfare in the closed economy are also su¢ cient statistics in the open economy. Thus, our approach
using the household-centric productivity residual can be applied empirically to measure welfare
2The important work of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007) has shed much light on this subject, but the
measurement errors that are inevitable in constructing national asset stocks lead to very noisy estimates of net asset
growth rates.
3We are indebted to Mikhail Dmitriev for pointing out this result.
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change regardless of the degree of openness of the economy.
Finally, we extend our model to allow for human capital accumulation using the stylized frame-
work of Lucas (1988). This allows us to take into account changes in human capital over time and
across countries in the measurement of welfare in a simple yet informative way.
These results pertain to the evolution of welfare in individual economies over time. The indexes
we obtain are not comparable across countries. Thus it is natural to ask whether our methods
shed any light on a pressing and long-standing question, the measurement of relative welfare across
countries using a method rmly grounded in economic theory. It turns out that they do. Perhaps
our most striking nding is the result that we can use data on cross-country di¤erences in TFP
and capital intensity, long the staples of discussion in the development and growth literatures, to
measure di¤erences in welfare across countries.
To understand this result, it helps to deepen the intuition o¤ered above. Our analysis is based
on a dynamic application of the envelope theorem, and it shows that the welfare of a representative
agent depends to a rst order on the expected time paths of the variables that the agent takes as
exogenous. In a dynamic growth context, these variables are the prices for factors the household
supplies (labor and capital), the prices for the goods it purchases (consumption and investment),
and beginning-of-period household assets, which are predetermined state variables and equal to the
capital stock in a closed economy. Apart from this last term, the households welfare depends on
the time paths of prices, which are exogenous to the household. Thus, the TFP that is directly
relevant for household welfare is actually the dual Solow residual, which we transform into the
familiar primal Solow residual using the national income identity.
Our cross-country welfare result comes from using the link between welfare and exogenous
prices implied by economic theory to ask how much a households welfare would di¤er if it faced
the sequence of prices, not of its own country, but of some other country. More precisely, we
perform the thought experiment of having a US household optimizing while facing the expected
time paths of all goods and factor prices in, say, France, and owning the initial stock of French
assets rather than US assets. The di¤erence between the resulting level of welfare and the welfare
of remaining in the US measures the gain or loss to a US household of being moved to France. Note
that this is a counterfactual thought experiment the US household in France will typically choose
di¤erent time paths for consumption, leisure and saving than the French household. Yet we show
that the welfare comparisons can be based on the productivity residuals constructed using just the
observed data of both countries, without the need to construct any counterfactual quantities.
Importantly, our approach allows performing cross-country welfare comparisons without the
need to know individualspreference parameters (other than the discount rate) and without having
to assume them equal across countries. Note that our welfare comparisons are from a denite point
of view in this example, from the view of a US household. In principle, the result could be
di¤erent if the USA-France comparison is made by a French household, with di¤erent preferences
over consumption and leisure. Fortunately, our empirical results are not greatly a¤ected by the
choice of the reference countryused for these welfare comparisons.
4
Our theoretical results are derived using a rst-order approximation, and its accuracy might
be a potential concern. To address it, we solve numerically a set of calibrated workhorse models
and compare the resulting welfare levels with those obtained from the rst-order approximation.
Reassuringly, we nd that the approximation is highly accurate for assessing welfare di¤erences,
both over time and across countries.
We illustrate our methods using data for several industrialized countries for which high-quality
data are available: Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States.
We show the importance of scal considerations in constructing measures of welfare change over
time. For example, if we assume that government spending is wasteful and taxes are lump-sum, the
UK has the largest welfare gain among our group of countries over our sample period, 1985-2005,
while Spain lags far behind due to its low TFP growth rate. Indeed, the US, a much richer country,
has faster welfare growth than Spain under these assumptions. Allowing for distortionary taxation
and assuming that government expenditure is not wasteful, Spain has the highest welfare growth
among all countries, with the UK a shade behind, and the US much further back.
However these welfare growth rates are country-specic indexes, and cannot be used to compare
welfare across countries. We next apply our methodology to cross country-comparisons for the
same seven advanced countries and show how relative welfare levels evolve over time. Although
the available data are not as good (for instance, information on hours worked are not available),
in addition to the countries listed above we also provide welfare comparisons for a larger set of
countries that includes both advanced and developing countries. In our benchmark case of optimal
government spending and distortionary taxation, the US is the welfare leader among large countries
throughout our sample period (in our larger data set, only Luxembourg enjoys higher welfare). In
our smaller sample with high-quality data, with one exception, the US pulls away from other
advanced countries in terms of welfare. The exception is the UK, which converges steadily to US
levels of welfare over time. In both data sets, the welfare di¤erences among countries are driven
to a much greater extent by TFP gaps than by di¤erences in capital intensity. This nding echoes
the conclusion of the development accounting literature, but for welfare di¤erences rather than
GDP gaps.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents our analytical framework, and
derives the results on the measurement of welfare within single economies and on welfare compar-
isons across countries. (Full derivations are presented in the appendix.) Section 3 extends the basic
framework to allow for multiple goods, distortionary taxes, government expenditure and an open
economy, and summarizes our results in their more general form. Section 4 reports simulations of
standard growth models to evaluate the accuracy of our approximation. We take our framework
to the data in Section 5. Section 6 relates our work to several distinct literatures. Lastly, we
summarize our ndings and suggest avenues for future research.
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2 The Productivity Residual and Welfare
Both intuition and formal empirical work link TFP growth to increases in the standard of living, at
least as measured by GDP per-capita.4 The usual justication for studying the Solow productivity
residual is that, under perfect competition and constant returns to scale, it measures technological
change, which contributes to GDP growth, one major determinant of welfare. Thus, the usual
connection between Solows residual and welfare is a roundabout one. Furthermore, this intuition
suggests that we should not care about the Solow residual in an economy with non-competitive
output markets, non-constant returns to scale, and possibly other distortions where the Solow
residual is no longer a good measure of technological progress. We show that the link between
Solows residual and welfare is immediate and solid, even when the residual does not measure
technical change. Here we build on the intuition of Basu and Fernald (2002) and derive rigorously
the relationship between a modied version of the productivity residual and the intertemporal
utility of the representative household. The fundamental result we obtain is that, to a rst-order
approximation, utility reects the present discounted value of productivity residuals (plus the initial
stock of capital).
Our results are complementary to those in Solows classic (1957) paper. Solow established
that, if there was an aggregate production function with constant returns to scale and all markets
were competitive, then his index measured its rate of change. We now show that under a very
di¤erent set of assumptions, which are disjoint from Solows, the familiar TFP index is also the
key component of an intertemporal welfare measure. The results are parallel to one another.
Solow did not need to assume anything about the consumer side of the economy to give a technical
interpretation to his index, but he had to make assumptions about technology and rm behavior.
We do not need to assume anything about the rm side (which includes technology and market
structure) in order to give a welfare interpretation, but we do need to assume the existence of a
representative consumer.5 Which result is more useful depends on the application, and the trade-
o¤ that one is willing to make between having a result that is very general on the consumer side
but requires very precise assumptions on technology and rm behavior, and a result that is just
the opposite.
2.1 Measuring welfare changes over time
We begin by assuming the familiar objective function for a representative household that maximizes
intertemporal utility. In a growth context one often neglects the dependence of welfare on leisure,
but the work of Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) suggests that this omission is not innocuous (see the
discussion in Section 6). Thus, we assume the household derives utility from both consumption
and leisure:
4For a review of the literature linking TFP to GDP per worker, in both levels and growth rates, see Weil (2008).
5At a technical level, both results assume the existence of a potential function (Hulten, 1973), and show that TFP
is the rate of change of that function.
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Wt = Et
1X
s=0
1
(1 + )s
Nt+s
H
1
1  Ct+s
1 (L  Lt+s) (1)
where Wt denotes the total welfare of the household, Ct is the per-capita consumption at time t,
Lt are per-capita hours of work and L is the per-capita time endowment. Nt is population and H
is the number of households, assumed to be xed and normalized to one from now on. Population
grows at a constant rate n and aggregate per capita variables at rate g: To ensure the existence
of a well-dened steady-state in which hours of work are constant while consumption and the real
wage share a common trend, we assume that the utility function has the King, Plosser and Rebelo
(1988) form with  > 0 and (:) > 0.6 The budget constraint facing the representative consumer
and the capital accumulation equation are respectively:
P It KtNt+BtNt = (1  )P It Kt 1Nt 1+
 
1 + iBt

Bt 1Nt 1+PLt LtNt+P
K
t Kt 1Nt 1+tNt PCt CtNt
(2)
and
KtNt = (1  )Kt 1Nt 1 + ItNt (3)
Kt, Bt and It denote per-capita capital, bonds and investment; PKt , P
L
t ; P
C
t and P
I
t denote,
respectively, the user cost of capital, the hourly wage, the price of consumption goods and of new
capital goods;
 
1 + iBt

is the nominal interest rate and t denotes per-capita prots, which are
paid lump-sum from rms to consumers. Assume for now that the economy is closed and there
is no government, which implies that in equilibrium Bt = 0. We derive analogous results for the
open economy with capital mobility and unbalanced trade (Bt 6= 0) in Section 3.4, and extend the
results in this section to allow for government expenditure, distortionary or lump-sum taxes, and
government bond issuance in Sections 3.1-3.2.
Dene equivalent consumptionper person, denoted by Ct , as the level of consumption per-
capita at time t that, if growing at the steady-state rate g from t onward, with leisure set at
its steady-state level, delivers the same per-capita intertemporal utility as the actual stream of
consumption and leisure. More precisely, Ct satises:
Wt
Nt
= Vt =
1X
s=0
(1 + n)s
(1 + )s
(Ct (1 + g)s)
1 
(1  ) (L  L)) (4)
=
1
(1  ) (1  )C
1 
t (L  L)
where Vt denotes per-capita utility and  =
(1+n)(1+g)1 
(1+) is the discount rate in the problem refor-
mulated in terms of stationary variables to allow for steady-state growth. We will measure welfare
changes over time in terms of equivalent consumption per-capita and relate them to observable
6 If  = 1, then the utility function must be U(C;L   L) = log(C) + (L   L): See King, Plosser and Rebelo
(1988).
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economic variables.
First we dene a few of the key variables used in our analysis. Consider a modied denition
of the Solow productivity residual:
 logPRt+s =  log Yt+s   sL logLt+s   sK logKt+s 1 (5)
where  log Yt = sC logCt + sI log It.  log Yt is a Divisia index of per-capita GDP growth,
where demand components are aggregated using constant steady-state shares. sC and sI denote
the steady-state values of sC;t =
PCt Ct
pYt Yt
and sI;t =
P It It
PYt Yt
respectively, and P Yt Yt represents per-capita
GDP in current prices.7 Distributional shares are also dened as the steady-state values, sL and
sK ; of sL;t  P
L
t Lt
PYt Yt
and sK;t  P
K
t Kt 1Nt 1
PYt YtNt
(note that the household receives remuneration on the
capital stock held at the end of the last period): We use the word modied in describing the
productivity residual for three reasons. First, we do not assume that the distributional shares of
capital and labor add to one, as they would if there were zero economic prots and no distortionary
taxes.8 Second, all shares are calculated at their steady-state values and, hence, are not time
varying, which is sometimes assumed when calculating the residual.9 Third, the residual is stated
in terms of per-capita rather than aggregate variables, although it should be noted that Solow
himself dened the residual on a per-capita basis (1957, equation 2a). Correspondingly, dene the
log level productivity residual as:
logPRt+s = sC logCt+s + sI log It+s   sL logLt+s   sK logKt+s 1 (6)
The prices in the budget constraint, equation (2), are dened in nominal terms. It will often
be easier to work with relative prices, and disregard complications that arise from price ination.
Taking the purchase price of new capital goods, P It , as numeraire, dene the following relative
prices: pKt =
PKt
P It
, pLt =
PLt
P It
and pCt =
PCt
P It
. Real per-capita prots are dened as t = tP It
:
Our approximations are taken around a steady-state path where the rst three relative prices are
constant and the wage pL grows at rate g, as in standard one-sector models of economic growth.
We also assume that all per-capita quantity variables other than labor hours (for example Yt, Ct,
It, etc.) grow at a common rate g in the steady-state. Note these assumptions imply that all of
the shares we have dened above are constant in the steady-state and so is the capital output ratio,
whose nominal steady-state value will be denoted by P
IK
PY Y
.10
7For now we set government expenditure to zero, and introduce it in our extension in Section 3.2. Our denition
of GDP departs slightly from convention, as value added is usually calculated using time-varying shares. The two
denitions coincide to a rst-order approximation.
8Zero prots are guaranteed in the benchmark case with perfect competition and constant returns to scale, but
can also arise with imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale as long as there is free entry as in the
standard Chamberlinian model of imperfect competition.
9Rotemberg and Woodford (1991) argue that in a consistent rst-order log-linearization of the production function
the shares of capital and labor should be taken to be constant, and Solows (1957) use of time-varying shares amounts
to keeping some second-order terms while ignoring others.
10We conjecture that all our results could be proved in the household environment corresponding to a two-sector
growth model as laid out, for example, in Whelan (2003) assuming that the steady-state shares are also constant,
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Under these assumptions we can show that welfare changes, as measured by equivalent con-
sumption, Ct , are, to a rst-order approximation, a linear function of the expectation of present
and future total factor productivity growth (and its revision), and of the initial capital stock. This
rst key result is summarized in:
Proposition 1 Assume that the representative household in a closed economy with no govern-
ment maximizes (1) subject to (2), taking prices, prots and interest rates as exogenously given.
Assume also that population grows at a constant rate n, and the wage and all per-capita quantities
other than hours worked grow at rate g in the steady-state. To a rst-order approximation, the
growth rate of equivalent consumption can be written as:
 logCt =
(1  )
sc
"
Et
1X
s=0
s logPRt+s +
1X
s=0
sEt logPRt+s 1 +
1


P IK
P Y Y

 logKt 1
#
(7)
Proof. Proofs of all propositions and extensions are collected in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that the expected present discounted value of current and future Solow
productivity residuals, together with the change in the initial stock of capital per-capita, is a
su¢ cient statistic for the welfare of a representative consumer (where we measure welfare as the
log change in equivalent consumption). The term Et logPRt+s = Et logPRt+s   Et 1 logPRt+s
represents the revision in expectations of the log level of the productivity residual, based on the new
information received between t  1 and t. Note that the expectation revision terms in the second
summation will reduce to a linear combination of the innovations in the stochastic shocks a¤ecting
the economy at time t. Moreover, if we assume that the modied log level productivity residual
follows a univariate autoregressive process, then only the innovation of such a process matters for
the expectation revision, and the rst summation is simply a function of current and past values
of productivity.
Since we have not made any assumptions about production technology and market structure,
the productivity terms may or may not measure technical change. For example, Solows residual
does not measure technical change in economies where rms have market power, or produce with
increasing returns to scale, or where there are Marshallian externalities. Even in these cases,
Proposition 1 shows that productivity and the capital stock are jointly a su¢ cient statistic for
welfare. Finally, as we show in Section 3, this basic result can be proved in much more general
environments for example, in an open economy, with government expenditure and debt, distor-
tionary taxes, multiple consumption goods, and human capital.
While the proof of the proposition requires somewhat complex notation and algebra, in the
remainder of this sub-section we shall try to convey the economic reasoning for the result by
considering the much simpler case of an economy with a zero steady-state growth rate (g = 0).
(Of course, the formal proof of Proposition 1 allows for g > 0.) We begin by taking a rst-order
approximation to the level of utility of the household (normalized by population) around the steady
as in Whelans setup.
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state.11 We then use the households rst-order conditions for optimality to obtain:
(Vt   V )
pY Y
= Et
1X
s=0
s
h
sL
dpLt+s + sK dpKt+s + s bt   sCdpCt+si+ 1

P IK
P Y Y

[Kt 1 (8)
Hatted variables denote log deviations from the steady-state (bxt = log xt   log x): Variables
without time subscripts denote steady-state values. Since g = 0,  = 1+n1+ .  is the Lagrange
multiplier associated with the budget constraint expressed, like utility, in per-capita terms. Equa-
tion (8) follows almost directly from the Envelope Theorem. An atomistic household maximizes
taking as given the sequences of current and expected future prices, lump-sum transfers (t), and
predetermined variables (in our environment, just Kt 1). Thus, only uctuations in these objects
a¤ect welfare to a rst order. The Envelope Theorem plus a bit of algebra shows that each change
in exogenous prices or prots needs to be multiplied by its corresponding share to derive its e¤ect
on welfare for example, the larger is sC the more the consumer su¤ers from a rise in the relative
price of consumption goods. (It may appear that the investment price is missing, but since we
normalized the relative price of investment goods to 1 it never changes.) The terms within the
summation can be thought of as the dual version of the productivity residual, as we will show
shortly.
Two comments are in order. First, the left hand side of the equation has an interesting
interpretation: it is the money value of the deviation of per-person utility from its steady-state level,
expressed as a fraction of steady-state GDP per person. To understand this interpretation, consider
the units. The numerator is in utils,which we divide by , which has units of utils/investment
good (since investment goods are our numeraire). The division gives us the deviation of utility
from its steady-state value measured in units of investment goods in the numerator. We then
scale the result by the real value of per-capita GDP, also stated in terms of investment goods
(recall that pY is a relative price). Second, note that we can express welfare change without
knowing the parameters of the utility function, other than the discount factor, : The right-hand
side only contains expectations of the Solow residual (and its revision) and the initial capital stock
per capita. Essentially, the parameters of the utility function are embedded in observed choices
for consumption, labor and capital, in the expenditure shares, in the distributional shares and in
the capital output ratios. Our basic idea is to use a revealed-preference approach, akin to the logic
behind the economic theory of index numbers. This approach uses observed choices to infer welfare
parameters (as, for example, expenditure shares reveal the relative importance of di¤erent prices
to the household).
However, we nd it more convenient and intuitive to express the left hand side of (8) in terms
of equivalent consumption. Using the denition in (4) and taking a rst order approximation of
Vt   V in terms of log Ct we obtain:
(Vt   V )
pY Y
=
sC
(1  )(logC

t   logC) (9)
11We approximate the level of V rather than its log because V < 0 if  > 1.
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where we have used the fact that in the steady state C = C and UC = pc:
The right hand side of (8) is written as a function of the log deviation from the steady-state
of prices, prots and the initial capital stock. Our results can also be presented using the familiar
(primal) productivity residual rather than stating them in terms of prices and transfers, as in
equation (8). However, if one uses a consistent data set, there is literally no di¤erence between the
two. One can show, using the per-capita version of the household budget constraint (2) and the
capital accumulation equation (3), that the following relationship must hold at all points in time:
sL
dpLt+s + sKdpKt+s + s bt   sCdpCt+s = sC bCt+s + sIdIt+s   sLbLt+s   sK \Kt+s 1: (10)
Since the budget constraint of the representative household is just the national income ac-
counts identity in per-capita terms, equation (10) says that in any data set where national income
accounting conventions are enforced, the primal productivity residual identically equals the dual
productivity residual.12 Thus we can express our results in either form, but using the dual result
would require us to provide an empirical measure of lump-sum transfers, which is not needed for
results based on the primal residual. Mostly for this reason, we work with the primal.
Using (9) and (10) in (8), we can write:
(logCt   logC) =
(1  )
sC
"
Et
1X
s=0
sdPRt+s + 1


P IK
P Y Y

[Kt 1
#
(11)
where now the log deviation of consumption is expressed as a function of the log deviation from
steady-state of the productivity residual, dened in equation (6). Taking di¤erences of equation
(11) and using the denition of the Solow residual in (5) gives the key equation of Proposition 1,
whose proof we have just sketched for the case of g = 0. When using either equivalent consumption
or the money value of utility as a metric for welfare comparisons one does not require knowledge of
the parameters of the utility function (except the discount factor ): The parameters of the utility
function are embedded in observed choices for consumption, labor and capital, in the expenditure
shares, in the distributional shares and in the capital-output ratio.
2.2 Implications for Cross Country Analysis
Proposition 1 pertains to the evolution of welfare in individual economies over time. The indexes
we obtain are not comparable across countries. However, in this sub-section we show that similar
methods can be used to do a rigorous welfare comparison across countries. More precisely, we show
that productivity and the capital stock su¢ ce to calculate di¤erences in welfare across countries,
with both variables computed as log level deviations from a reference country.
Welfare comparisons across countries have been investigated recently by Jones and Klenow
(2010), who focus on a point-in-time comparison of single-period ow utility. By comparison, we
focus on intertemporal (lifetime) utility, and show how out-of-steady-state dynamics are related to
12See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, section 10.2).
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capital accumulation and productivity.13
A comparison of welfare across countries requires either assuming that their respective repre-
sentative agents possess the same utility function, or making the comparison from the perspective
of the representative agent in a reference country. We favor the second option, and consider the
thought experiment of a household from a reference country j facing the prices, per-capita prots
and initial capital stock of country i instead of those in country j. We then study the di¤erence
in the utility of a representative member of the household and, as in the within-country case, we
conduct the comparison by using the concept of equivalent consumption. In this context for the rep-
resentative agent of the reference country j living in country i, equivalent per-capita consumption,eC;it satises:
eV it = 1
(1  j)  1  j
 eC;it 1 j (L  Lj) (12)
where eV it denotes per-capita utility of the individual from country j, facing country is relative
prices, per-capita prots and per-capita initial capital stock (we use to denote these counterfactual
quantities). Note that eC;it is dened for a constant level of leisure xed at country js steady-state
level. We will use V jt and C
;j
t to denote per-capita utility and equivalent consumption of the
individual of country j living in country j. We take rst-order approximations of eV it , V jt ; and the
budget constraints around the steady state of country j.
Proposition 2 Assume that in a reference country, country j, the representative household
maximizes (1) subject to (2), under the assumptions of Proposition 1. Assume now that the house-
hold of country j is confronted with the sequence of prices, per-capita prots and initial capital
stock of country i: In a closed economy with no government, to a rst order approximation, the
di¤erence in equivalent consumption between living in a generic country i versus country j can be
written as:
log eC;it  logC;jt = (1  j)
sjc
"
Et
1X
s=0
(j)s

logPR
i
t+s   logPRjt+s

+
1
j

P I;jKj
P Y;jY j

logKit 1   logKjt 1
#
(13)
where the productivity terms are constructed using country js shares in the following fashion:
logPR
i
t+s =

sjC logC
i
t+s + s
j
I log I
i
t+s

  sjL logLit+s   sjK logKit+s 1 (14)
and:
logPRjt+s =

sjC logC
j
t+s + s
j
I log I
j
t+s

  sjL logLjt+s   sjK logKjt+s 1 (15)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Welfare di¤erences across countries are therefore summarized by two components. The rst
component is related to the well-known log di¤erence between TFP levels, which accounts em-
13We do not, however, allow for cross country di¤erences in life expectancy or in inequality as in Jones and Klenow
(2010).
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pirically for most of the di¤erence in per-capita income across countries (Hall and Jones (1999)),
although it is the present value of the gap that matters for welfare. In the development accounting
literature, this gap is interpreted as a measure of technological or institutional di¤erences between
countries. This interpretation, however, is valid under restrictive assumptions on market structure
and technology (perfect competition, constant returns to scale, no externalities, etc.). We provide
a welfare interpretation of cross-country di¤erences in TFP that applies even when these assump-
tions do not hold. The second component of the welfare di¤erence reects the di¤erence in capital
intensity between the two countries; ceteris paribus, a country with more capital per person can
a¤ord more consumption or higher leisure. The development accounting literature also uses capital
intensity as the second variable explaining cross-country di¤erences in per-capita income.
Our result holds for any kind of technology and market structure, as long as a representative
consumer exists, takes prices as given and is not constrained in the amount he can buy and sell at
those prices. Notice however, that our measure of per-capita TFP is modied with respect to the
traditional growth accounting measure in two ways. First, measuring welfare di¤erences requires
comparing not only current log di¤erences in TFP but the present discounted value of future ones
as well. Second, the distributional and expenditure shares used to compute the log di¤erences in
TFP between countries need to be calculated at their steady-state values in the reference country.14
As in the case of Proposition 1, we shall try to convey the economic reasoning for the result by
considering the simple case of an economy with a zero steady-state growth rate (g = 0). Assume
we confront the household from country j with the prices, prots and the initial per-capita capital
stock of country i: If we expand the utility of a representative member of the household, denoted
by eV it , around the steady state of his own country, we obtain:
(eV it   V j)
jpY;jY j
= Et
1X
s=0
(j)s[sjL(log p
L;i
t+s   log pL;j) + sjK(log pK;it+s   log pK;j) (16)
+sj(log 
i
t+s   log j)  sjC(log pC;it+s   log pC;j)]
+
1
j

P I;jKj
P Y;jY j
 
logKit 1   logKj

Now expand per-capita utility for country js household around its own steady-state and subtract
from (16). This yields:
(eV it   V jt )
jpY;jY j
= Et
1X
s=0
(j)s[sjL(log p
L;i
t+s   log pL;jt+s) + sjK(log pK;it+s   log pK;jt+s) (17)
+sj(log 
i
t+s   log jt+s)  sjC(log pC;it+s   log pC;jt+s)]
+
1
j

P I;jKj
P Y;jY j

logKit 1   logKjt 1

Di¤erences in welfare across countries are, therefore, due to di¤erences in their relative prices,
14 It is standard in the development accounting literature to assume that all countries have the same capital and
labor shares in income (often one-third and two-thirds), but to use country-specic shares in expenditure.
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per-capita prots and capital intensities.
Use (12) to express di¤erences in utility across countries in term of log di¤erences in equivalent
consumption on the left hand side of (17). Now linearize two budget constraints around country
js steady state: rst, the budget constraint for the household from country j if moved to country
i and, second, its budget constraint when living in its own country. Subtracting one from the other
allows us to write the right hand side of (17) in terms of productivity di¤erences and di¤erences in
the initial capital stock. This yields equations (13), (14), and (15) in Proposition 2.15
Notice that in stating Proposition 2, we have not needed to assume that either the population
growth rate n or the per-capita growth rate g is common across countries.16 Most importantly, we
do not need to know the parameters of the utility function (other than ) to perform cross country
welfare comparisons, nor do we need to assume that any of those parameters (including ) is
common across countries. This is because we are making the comparisons in terms of di¤erences in
equivalent consumption and from the point of view of the representative individual in the reference
country, who is faced with the exogenous (to the household) prices, lump-sum transfers and initial
conditions of country i.
Notice that this thought experiment does not simply assign to the household from the reference
country the consumption and leisure choices made by the household from country i: Rather, our ap-
proach allows the reference-country household to re-optimize when facing the conditions of country
i: Even if faced with the same exogenous variables, the choices of the two households will generally
di¤er, unless their preferences are identical. However, to a rst order approximation, the algebraic
sum of the terms in prices, prots, and initial conditions for the household from country j facing
country is prices, prots, and endowments equals the algebraic sum of the terms in consumption,
labor supply and capital chosen by the individual from country i. We exploit this fact to eliminate
the need to construct counterfactual quantities in calculating the welfare change for a household of
country j moving to country i:17
3 Extensions
We now show that our method of using TFP to measure welfare can be extended to allow for
the presence of taxes and government expenditure, multiple types of consumption and investment
goods, and an open economy setting. We also extend the problem of the household to allow for
human capital accumulation. These extensions require modications in the formulas given above
for welfare comparisons over time and across countries, and we state the changes to the basic
framework that are needed in each case; detailed derivations are given in the appendix. These
15We can show that, in the special case in which all countries are in the steady state, share a common growth
rate, and consumers do not derive utility from leisure, cross country welfare comparisons reduce to comparing Net
National Product. This result is in the spirit of Weitzman (1976, 2003). We thank Chad Jones for this observation.
16Both introspection and the results of Kremer, Onatski and Stock (2001) suggest that it is implausible to assume
that countries will diverge perpetually in per-capita terms. Thus, even though we do not need to assume a common
g, we would not view it as a restrictive assumption.
17See the equations leading up to (A.28) in the Appendix.
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results prove that the basic idea of using TFP to measure welfare holds in a variety of economic
environments, but they also demonstrate the advantage of deriving the welfare measure from an
explicit dynamic model of the household.
In what follows, we discuss the generalization of our measure of welfare changes over time.
Analogous results apply to the measurement of cross-country welfare di¤erences.
3.1 Taxes
Consider rst an environment with distortionary and/or lump-sum taxes. Since the prices in the
budget constraint (2) are those faced by the consumer, in the presence of taxes all prices should be
interpreted as after-tax prices. At the same time, the variable that we have been calling prots,
t, can be viewed as comprising any transfer of income that the consumer takes as exogenous.
Thus, it can be interpreted to include lump-sum taxes or rebates. Finally one should think of Bt as
including both government and private bonds (assumed to be perfect substitutes, purely for ease
of notation).
More precisely, in order to modify (2) to allow for taxes, let Kt be the tax rate on capital income,
Rt be the tax rate on revenues from bonds, 
L
t be the tax rate on labor income, 
C
t be the ad valorem
tax on consumption goods, and  It be the corresponding tax on investment goods.
18 Also, let PC0t
and P I0t respectively denote the pre-tax prices of consumption and capital goods, so that the tax-
inclusive prices faced by the consumer are PC0t
 
1 + Ct

and P I0t
 
1 +  It

: We assume for the time
being that the revenue so raised is distributed back to individuals using lump-sum transfers; we
consider government expenditures in the next sub-section. The representative households budget
constraint now is:
P I0t
 
1 +  It

KtNt +BtNt = (1  )P I0t
 
1 +  It

Kt 1Nt 1 +
 
1 + iBt
 
1  Rt

Bt 1Nt 1 (18)
+PLt
 
1  Lt

LtNt + P
K
t
 
1  Kt

Kt 1Nt 1 +tNt   PC0t
 
1 + Ct

CtNt
Thus, di¤erently than in the benchmark case, the exogenous variables in the households maxi-
mization are not only the prices and the initial stocks of capital and bonds, but also the tax rates
on labor and capital income, consumption and investment. However, it can be easily shown that
the basic results (7) and (13) continue to hold. The only modication is that in dening the Solow
productivity residual we need to take account of the fact that the national accounts measure factor
payments as perceived by rms that is, before income taxes while nominal expenditure is mea-
sured using prices as perceived from the demand side, thus inclusive of indirect taxes (subsidies) on
consumption and investment. Hence, letting PCt = P
C0
t
 
1 + Ct

and P It = P
I0
t
 
1 +  It

denote the
tax-inclusive prices of consumption and investment goods, the expenditure shares sC and sI dened
earlier are fully consistent with those obtained from national accounts data, but the factor shares
18For simplicity, we are assuming no capital gains taxes and no expensing for depreciation. These could obviously
be added at the cost of extra notation.
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sL and sK dened above refer to the gross income of labor and capital rather than their respective
after-tax income. Thus, to be consistent with the data, in the presence of taxes the welfare residual
needs to be redened in terms of the shares of after-tax returns on labor and capital. Specically,
equation (5) can be re-written as:
 logPRt+s =  log Yt+s  
 
1  L sL logLt+s    1  K sK logKt+s 1 (19)
and an analogous modication applies to (14) and (15). L and K are the steady-state values of
Lt and 
K
t With these modications, our results generalize to a setting with distortionary time-
varying taxes on consumption and investment goods and on the households income coming from
labor, capital or nancial assets.
3.2 Government Expenditure
With some minor modication, our framework can be likewise extended to allow for the provision of
public goods and services (see the Appendix for details). We illustrate this under the assumption
that government activity is nanced with lump-sum taxes. Using the results from the previous
subsection, it is straightforward to extend the argument to the case of distortionary taxes.
Assume that government spending takes the form of public consumption valued by consumers.
We rewrite instantaneous utility as:
U(Ct+s; CG;t+s; Lt+s) =
1
1  
(Ct+s;CG;t+s)
1 (L  Lt+s) (20)
where CG denotes per-capita public consumption and 
(:) is homogenous of degree one in its
arguments. Total GDP now includes public consumption: that is, P Yt Yt = P
C
t Ct + P
G
t CGt + P
I
t It,
where PG is the public consumption deator.
In this setting, our earlier results need to be modied to take account of the fact that public
consumption may not be set by the government at the level that consumers would choose. In-
tuitively, in such circumstances the value that consumers attach to public consumption may not
coincide with its observed value as included in GDP, and therefore in the productivity residual as
conventionally dened.
Formally, let scGt =
PGt CGt
PYt Yt
denote the GDP share of public consumption, and let scGt denote the
share that would obtain if public consumption were valued according to its marginal contribution to
the utility of the representative household, rather than using its deator PGt .
19 The welfare-relevant
modied Solow residual (5) now is:
 logPRt+s =  log Yt+s   sL logLt+s   sK logKt+s 1 +
 
scG   scG

 logCG;t+s (21)
and an analogous modication applies to (14) and (15). Hence in the presence of public consump-
tion the Solow residual needs to be adjusted up or down depending on whether public consumption
19 It is easy to verify that scGt =
UCGt
PCt CGt
UCtP
Y
t Yt
:
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is under- or over-provided (i.e., scG > scG or s

cG
< scG respectively). If the government sets public
consumption exactly at the level the utility-maximizing household would have chosen if confronted
with a price of PGt , then s

cG
= scG and no correction is necessary. In turn, in the standard neo-
classical case in which public consumption is pure waste scG = 0, the welfare residual should be
computed on the basis of private nal demand i.e., GDP minus government purchases. With the
residual redened in this way, the growth rate of equivalent consumption now is:20
 log (Ct)
 =
(1  )
(sC + sCG)
"
Et
1X
s=0
s logPRt+s +
1X
s=0
sEt logPRt+s 1 +
1


P IK
P Y Y

 logKt 1
#
(22)
3.3 Multiple Types of Consumption and Investment Goods
The extension to the case of multiple types of consumption and investment goods is immediate.
The instantaneous utility function can be written as:
U(C1;t+s; ::; CZC ;t+s; Lt+s) =
1
1  C(C1;t+s; ::; CZC ;t+s)
1 

L  Lt+s)

(23)
where C(:) is a homogenous functions of degree one and Z is the number of consumption goods.
Denote by PCzt the price of a unit of Cz;t; Similarly, assume that consumers can purchase ZI
di¤erent types of investment goods Iz;t at prices P
Iz
t ; and combine them into capital according
to a constant-returns aggregate investment index. Thus, investment (in per-capita terms) can be
expressed It = I(I1;t; :::; IZI ;t), and the trajectory of the capital stock is still described by equation
(3). Further, we can dene (exact) deators for consumption and investment PCt+s and P
I
t+s, each of
which is a linear homogenous function of the prices of the underlying individual types of goods, such
that PCt+sCt+s =
PZC
z=1 P
Cz
t+sCz;t+s and P
I
t+sIt+s =
PZI
z=1 P
Iz
t+sIz;t+s.
21 Insert these two denitions
in equation (2) to obtain the new budget constraint.
In this framework, our earlier results continue to hold without modication: the applicable
expression for the modied Solow residual still is (5), and welfare changes over time and di¤erences
across countries continue to be characterized by (7) and (13) respectively. The only new feature
is that the GDP shares of consumption and investment can also be expressed as the sums of the
shares of their respective disaggregated components evaluated at the steady state; e.g., sCt =
20Government purchases might also yield productive services to private agents. For example, the government could
provide education or health services, or public infrastructure, which aside from being directly valued by consumers
 may raise private-sector productivity. In such case, the results in the text remain valid, but it is important to note
that the contribution of public expenditure to welfare would not be fully captured by the last term in the modied
Solow residual as written in the text. To this term we would need to add a measure of the productivity of public
services, which is implicitly included in the other terms in the expression.
21The existence of these perfect price indices under the assumptions made in the text was established by the classic
literature on two-stage consumption budgeting; see Lloyd (1977). The extension to investment is discussed by Servén
(1995).
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PCt Ct
PYt Yt
=
PZC
h=1 sCz;t ; where sCz ;t =
PCzt Cz;t
PYt Yt
: Moreover,  logCt, and  log It are Divisia indexes
(with xed weights) of individual consumption and investment goods.
3.4 Open Economy
Our results also apply to an open economy if we just replace GDP with domestic absorption in the
denition of the Solow residual, and thus rewrite (5) as:
 logPRt+s =  logAt+s   sL logLt+s   sK logKt+s 1 (24)
where  logAt = sC logCt + sI log It is a Divisia index of domestic absorption growth (in real
per-capita terms), and sL, sK , sC and sI are shares out of domestic absorption.  logCt and
 log It are, in turn, Divisia indices of domestically produced and imported goods aggregated with
xed weights, as discussed in the previous subsection. In addition, the steady-state capital-output
ratio in (7) and ensuing expressions in the preceding section should also be replaced with the
steady-state capital-absorption ratio. It is true that now the initial stock of net foreign assets,
and the return on those assets, would appear along with the initial capital stock, prots, and
prices as a determinant of utility in equation (8). However they would also appear in the budget
constraint (10) and would cancel out in the primal version of the productivity residual, provided
the latter is dened in terms of absorption (see the Appendix for details). As a consequence, all
the results we have stated in terms of the primal productivity residual continue to hold.22
Alternatively, one may want to use a standard measure of output, real GDP, dened as con-
sumption, plus investment, plus net exports. Then the welfare-relevant residual can be written as
the sum of a conventionally-dened productivity residual plus additional components that capture
terms of trade and capital gains e¤ects. Moreover, the initial conditions then should include the
initial value of the net foreign asset stock.
To show this, assume that the domestic economy buys imports IMt+sNt+s at a price P IMt+s
and sells domestic goods abroad EXt+sNt+s at a price PXt+s. The current account balance can be
written:
BtNt  Bt 1Nt 1 = itBt 1Nt 1 + PEXt EXtNt   P IMt IMtNt (25)
where Bt is taken to denote the per-capita foreign asset stock. The applicable Divisia index of per-
capita GDP growth now is  log Yt = sC logCt+ sI log It +sX logEXt  sM log IMt, where
sC , sI , sX and sM are respectively the steady-state shares of consumption, investment, exports
and imports out of total value added.
Using these denitions, welfare changes can be related to a productivity residual corrected for
22We could also allow for bond nancing of government expenditure. The existence of domestic government bonds,
in addition to foreign assets, does not change our results when they are expressed in terms of the primal version of
the productivity residual.
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terms of trade changes and changes in the rate of return on foreign assets:
 logPRTTt+s =  log Yt+s   sL logLt+s   sK logKt+s 1 (26)
+sX log p
EX
t+s   sM log pIMt+s +

Br
P Y Y

 log rt+s
where sL and sK are also shares out of total value added, r is the real rate of return on foreign
assets, and
 
Br
PY Y

is the steady-state ratio of foreign asset income to GDP. Changes in welfare
can be summarized by an expression similar to (7), but based on (26) rather than the conventional
Solow residual:
 logCt =
(1  )
sc
"
Et
1X
s=0
s logPRTTt+s +
1X
s=0
sEt logPRTTt+s 1 (27)
+
1


P IK
P Y Y

 logKt 1 +
1


B
P Y Y

 log
Bt 1
P It 1
#
Conceptually, it makes very good sense that all these extra terms come into play when taking
the GDP route to the measurement of welfare in the open economy. The e¤ects of an improvement
in the terms of trade, as captured by sX log pEXt   sM log pIMt in (26), are analogous to those
of an increase in TFP - both give the consumer higher consumption for the same input of capital
and labor (and therefore higher welfare); see Kohli (2004) for a static version of this result. In
turn, the term in  log rt+s captures present and expected future changes in the rate of return on
foreign assets, including capital gains and losses on net foreign assets due either to exchange rate
movements or to changes in the foreign currency prices of the assets. Finally, the initial conditions
now include not only the (domestic) capital stock, but also the net stock of foreign assets.
Measuring these extra terms empirically poses major challenges, however. One needs reliable
measures of changes in foreign asset holdings for a large sample of countries. Asset returns would
have to be measured in risk-adjusted terms to make them comparable across countries. In addition,
forecasts of future asset returns and the terms of trade would be required as well. In contrast, all
these problems disappear if the measurement of welfare is based on real absorption rather than
GDP as the measure of output, in which case the same terms that summarize welfare in the closed
economy su¢ ce to measure it in the open economy. The implication is that we can measure welfare
empirically in ways that are invariant to the degree of openness of the economy.
3.5 Summing up
We can now go back to the two propositions stated earlier. They were formulated for the special
case of a closed economy with no government. In light of the discussion in this section, we can now
restate them in a generalized form for an open economy with multiple goods and a government
sector, which is more appropriate for empirical implementation.
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Proposition 1Assume an open economy in which the government engages in public con-
sumption, and levies taxes on labor and capital income at rates Lt+s and 
K
t+s; as well as taxes on
consumption and investment expenditure at rates Ct+s and 
I
t+s. Assume also that the representa-
tive household maximizes intertemporal utility, taking prices, prots, interest rates, tax rates and
public consumption as exogenously given. Lastly, assume that population grows at a constant rate
n, and the wage and all per-capita quantities other than hours worked grow at rate g in the steady
state. To a rst-order approximation, the growth rate of equivalent consumption can be written as:
 log (Ct)
 =
(1  )
(sC + sCG)
"
Et
1X
s=0
s logPRt+s +
1X
s=0
sEt logPRt+s 1 +
1


P IK
PAA

 logKt 1
#
(28)
where productivity growth is dened as:
 logPRt+s = sC logCt+s+sI log It+s+s

CG
 logCG;t+s 
 
1  L sL logLt+s  1  K sK logKt+s 1
(29)
All shares are dened relative to total absorption, At: logCt and log It are share weighted aggre-
gates (with xed weights) of individual types of domestically produced and imported consumption
and investment goods. Shares and tax rates are evaluated at their steady-state values, and sCG
denotes the steady-state share of public consumption in total absorption that would obtain if public
consumption were valued according to its marginal contribution to the utility of the representative
household.
Proof. See the Appendix.
By stating (28), as well as all the expenditure and income shares entering the productivity
residual, in terms of absorption, the proposition applies to both open and closed economies. Fur-
ther, as explained earlier, the value of sCG depends on the assumptions made about government
consumption: if the latter is set at the level the representative household would have chosen if
she were facing the price PG, then sCG = sCG =
PGCG
PCC+P II+PGCG
. Alternatively, if government
consumption is pure waste (i.e., if it does not enter the consumption aggregate C in (20)), sCG = 0.
This implies that the proposition can encompass a variety of cases with respect to taxation and
government spending: 1) wasteful government spending with lump sum taxes (in which case distor-
tionary taxes are set to zero in the productivity equation); 2) optimal government spending with
lump sum taxes; 3) wasteful government spending with distortionary taxes; 4) optimal government
spending with distortionary taxes.
Our main result regarding welfare di¤erences across countries can be restated in a similar way:
Proposition 2 Assume that in a reference country j , the representative household maximizes
intertemporal utility under the assumptions of Proposition 1. Assume now that the household of
country j; is confronted with the sequence of prices, tax rates, per-capita prots, other lump sum
transfers, public consumption, and endowment of country i: In an open economy with distortionary
taxation and government spending, the di¤erence in equivalent consumption between living in coun-
20
try i versus country j can be written, to a rst order approximation, as:
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where Aj denotes absorption and sjCG the steady-state share of public consumption in total absorp-
tion that would obtain if public consumption were valued according to its marginal contribution to
the utility of the representative household. The two productivity terms are constructed with all shares
(in terms of absorption) and tax rates evaluated at the reference countrys steady-state values:
logPRjt = s
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C logC
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I log I
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where logC and log I are share weighted aggregates (with the xed weights of the reference country)
of individual types of domestically produced and imported consumption and investment goods.
Proof. The proof follows from the proof of Proposition 2, together with the cross country analogues
of the extensions contained in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2shows that our method for comparing welfare across countries applies in a much
more general setting than the one we used previously. We can compare two economies with any
degree of openness to trade or capital ows, and with di¤ering levels of distortionary taxation or
government expenditure. The derivation shows a result that would be hard to intuit ex ante, which
is that to a rst-order approximation only the tax rates of the reference country enter the welfare
comparison.23 This asymmetry implies that welfare rankings may depend on the choice of reference
country. In our empirical application in Section 5.3 below we take the US as our reference country,
but check the robustness of the results by using France instead.24
3.6 An extension with human capital
We will use the results summarized in Propositions 1and 2to evaluate welfare over time within
each country and across countries. In doing so it may be useful, particularly in the cross country
comparisons, to account for di¤erences in human capital. It goes beyond the scope of this paper
to provide an exhaustive analysis of the implications of human capital accumulation for welfare
measurement. However, we will develop in this subsection an extension of our model in the spirit
of Lucas (1988). As in Lucas, we will assume that non-leisure time can be used either to work or
to accumulate human capital and that the accumulation of human capital is linear in the stock of
23Of course, the tax rates of the comparison country will generally change output and input levels in that country
through general-equilibrium e¤ects, which will inuence the welfare gap between the two countries. However, the tax
rates of the comparison country do not enter the formula directly.
24We conjecture that the asymmetry may be eliminated by moving to second-order approximations, where instead
of using the tax-adjusted shares of the reference country only, one might take an arithmetic average of the shares of
the reference and comparison countries. We are investigating this possibility in current research.
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human capital.25 More specically assume that the per-period utility function of the representative
individual is now U(Ct;L   Lt   Et), where Et denotes the amount of time devoted to human
capital accumulation. We assume that the labor income per person can be written as PLt Ht 1Lt,
where Lt continues to denote hours worked, Ht 1 the initial level of human capital, and PLt the
hourly price of one unit of human capital. The human capital accumulation equation is assumed
to be:
(Ht  Ht 1) + HHt 1 = F (Et)Ht 1 (33)
where F 0(Et) > 0 and F (0) = 0. It is possible to show that equivalent consumption now also
depends upon the change in the initial level of human capital. Moreover, labor input must be
adjusted for human capital growth in the denition of productivity growth. Thus, equations (28)
and (29) now become:
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Summarizing, in the presence of human capital, the denition of productivity must account for
the e¤ect on total labor input of both hours and human capital changes. Note that human capital
investment does not show up as part of GDP because in the Lucas formulation it is only a subtrac-
tion from leisure and does not require any other physical input. Moreover, human capital must now
be included among the initial conditions, alongside physical capital. In the empirical section, we
will present results accounting for human capital in the measurement of welfare di¤erences across
countries and over time.
3.7 Further Discussion: Non-Price-Taking Households
So far we have assumed that the household is a price-taker in goods and factor markets, and that it
faces no constraints other than the intertemporal budget constraint. We have exploited the insight
25See the Appendix for details. Lucas showed that this formulation of the capital accumulation equation generates
a positive steady-state growth rate, even if there is no exogneous technological progress. If the production function of
goods is constant returns in physical and human capital, then all the relevant quantities grow at the same rate. These
results extend to the case in which the leisure choice is endogenized, although in this case there are some parameters
congurations for which multiple steady-state balanced growth paths exist (Ladron de Guevara, Ortigueira and Santos
(1999)).
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that under these conditions relative prices measure the representative consumers marginal rate of
substitution between goods, even when relative prices do not measure the economys marginal rate
of transformation. We now discuss whether our conclusions need to be modied in environments
where the household does not behave as a price taker or faces quantity constraints.
In our working paper, Basu, Pascali, Schiantarelli and Serven (2012), we present two examples
where households are not price takers; we refer the reader to that paper for details. Our examples
focus on the labor market, since the price-taking assumption seems most questionable in that
setting. Indeed several literatures (on labor search, union wage setting, and e¢ ciency wages, to
name three) begin by assuming that households are not price takers in the labor market. Our rst
example is in the spirit of the dual labor markets literature, where wages are above their market-
clearing level in some sectors but not in other. We do not model why wages are higher in the
primary sector, but this can be due to the presence of unions or government mandates in formal
but not in informal employment, or e¢ ciency wage considerations in some sectors but not in others.
Wages in the secondary market are set competitively. The second example is a model of the labor
market, where rms pay di¤erent wages but workers do not know ex ante which rms pay high
wages. Knowing the distribution of wages, household need to decide how many workers should
participate in the labor market and how many should stay home to enjoy leisure. Households would
prefer to supply all their labor to the sector or rm that pays the highest wage, but are unable
to do so since all decisions must be made ex-ante. In this sense, both examples feature a type of
labor market rationing. (In both cases the di¤erent wages are paid to identical workers, and are
not due to di¤erences in human capital characteristics.)
We show that when marginal and average wages di¤er, the change in work hours need to be
weighted by the marginal wage. In the dual labor markets example, this would be the wage in the
secondary sector. Or, in models where workers have market power (as in standard New Keynesian
models), one needs to divide the observed wage by the wage markup to create a competitive shadow
wagethat accurately reects the disutility of work. Even in these cases, though the details of our
implementation change, our conclusion that welfare can be summarized by a forward-looking TFP
measure and capital intensity remain robust. However, the weight on labor input may di¤er from
the observed labor share.
The second example has households face a whole distribution of wages without knowing which
wage they will receive after nding a job. Thus, workers equate the disutility of work to the ex
ante expected wage, which is also the ex post average wage. Even though the law of one price
does not hold in this environment identical workers are paid di¤erent wages we show that the
observed labor share is exactly the right weight to apply to changes in work hours. Thus, even
in this richer environment, our basic welfare measures summarized in Section 3.5 are accurate and
need no modication.
From these examples, it is clear that dropping the assumption that all consumers face the same
price for each good or service can but need not change the precise nature of the proxies we
develop for welfare. While the exact nature of the proxy will necessarily be model-dependent, we
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believe that our basic insight applies under fairly general conditions.
4 The quality of our approximation: Some examples
A potential concern with our main results, as stated in Proposition 1and 2, is that they are proved
using rst-order approximations. This approach may seem especially problematic for cross-country
comparisons, where gaps in living standards are often large. We now use simple general-equilibrium
models to investigate the quantitative error introduced by our use of approximations. We consider
a set of workhorse models that are standard in the macroeconomic literature, solve them, and then
compare the calculated welfare values to our approximated measures.26 The details of these models
and their calibration, which are both standard, can be found in the Appendix.
First, we discuss the quality of the approximation in a within-country analysis. Figure (1)
reports the impulse response function of our measure of approximated welfare and compares it to
welfare measures based on third-order approximations, in four standard macro models subject to
di¤erent types of shocks. Panel (a) reports the impulse response of both equivalent consumption
and our approximated measure of it following a one-standard deviation technology shock in a
standard Ramsey growth model. The two lines are practically indistinguishable. On impact,
equivalent consumption increases by 19.35% while its approximated value increases by 19.32%.27
In the following periods, the approximated value converges monotonically to the exact one. The
non-linearity of the utility function does not have a large e¤ect on the quality of the approximation.
In panel (b), we perform the same experiment as in panel (a) but using an extremely concave utility
function: we raise the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion from a common business-cycle value of
1.1 to 10. Following the technology shock, on impact equivalent consumption increases by 19.19%
while its approximated value again increases by 19.32%.28 As we would expect, the approximation
error is larger when the utility function is more concave, but the magnitude of the di¤erence is still
quite small and converges to zero quickly.
To ensure that the quality of the approximation is not a peculiarity of the Ramsey model, in
the following panels, we perform the same exercise in di¤erent theoretical frameworks. Panel (c)
considers a technological shock in a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model with standard calibration.
Panel (d) considers a tax shock in a RBC model with distortionary income taxes and wasteful public
26We compare welfare across countries assuming that they are at their steady states. These calculations are
exact solutions of the non-linear models. For the comparisons over time in within-country, dynamic settings, we
solve the models using third-order approximations and compare our results based on rst-order approximations
to the third-order solutions. To check the third-order approximations, we also solved the models using fourth-
order approximations and solved the simpler models using global methods. In both cases the results were barely
distinguishable numerically from the third-order solutions, so we think these are a good baseline for the purposes of
checking the rst-order approximations.
27Here and in the rest of the paper, we use percent (%) change to refer to di¤erences in natural logs multiplied by
100.
28 It is not a coincidence that the approximated rst-period welfare change is the same in the two models. Since
both models are neoclassical, the time path of TFP is just the exogenous shocks to technology, which is the same in
the two cases. Moreover, since we shock both models starting at their steady states, the period t  1 change in the
capital stock is also the same in the two models zero.
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expenditure. Panel (e) considers a public expenditure shock in a RBC model with lump-sum taxes,
wasteful public expenditure and production externalities. Note that in these last two cases, our
welfare-relevant TFP di¤ers from exogenous technology in the rst case due to taxes, and in the
second case because of the externality. In all three cases, however, the rst-order approximation
gives results that are close to the calculated value for welfare.
We next evaluate the approximation in a cross-country setting and compare steady-state welfare
di¤erences between countries. Comparing steady states allows us to solve for the exact values of
welfare in the two countries, and compare the gap to our approximated result. In our theoretical
results, which we take to the data later in the paper, we allow for both steady-state and transitory
welfare gaps between countries. To evaluate the approximation error for this type of comparison,
one can take the approximation error for transitory shocks which we just discussed and add it to
the approximation error for the steady-state di¤erences.
We use a standard RBC model with distortionary income taxes to analyze welfare gaps between
countries. Both countries are assumed to be in their respective steady state. We compute the
change in equivalent consumption of a representative agent in a reference country who moves
permanently to a di¤erent country characterized by di¤erent exogenous technology parameters or
tax rates. We then compute the approximated change in equivalent consumption and see how it
compares to the exact value. We conduct three di¤erent experiments, with the results in the three
panels of Figure 2. First, in panel (a), we consider an increase in the capital elasticity parameter
from 0.28 to 0.39 (thus moving from British to Canadian capital shares, the two extremes in our
sample): it produces a steady-state increase in equivalent consumption of 73.77%, while the result
from our approximation is 72.78%. Second, in panel (b), we consider an increase in the income
tax rate from 30% to 40% (thus moving from the average US tax rate over 1985-2005 to the
French average over the same period of time): it produces a reduction in equivalent consumption
of 16.58 percent while the approximated change is 13.85 percent. Finally, in panel (c), we consider
di¤erences in technology. The gure illustrates the exact and the approximated change in equivalent
consumption when the level of technology drop to a fraction x of its original level. Moving to a
country with a level of productivity that is 50% (10%) that of the reference country implies a
reduction in equivalent consumption of 69.31 (230.26% ), while the approximated value is 65.90%
(218.90%). It is interesting to note that the approximation error is largest for di¤erences in tax
rates. However, all the changes we consider are large ones. Relative to the large size of the welfare
gaps we are considering, we believe the approximation errors are modest and quite acceptable.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Data and Measurement
We illustrate the potential of our methodology by computing welfare indexes over the period 1985-
2005 for a set of large, developed countries for which high quality time series data are available:
US, UK, Japan, Canada, France, Italy and Spain. We use two di¤erent data sets to compare
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welfare within a country and across countries. Given the interest in welfare comparisons for a more
heterogeneous group of countries, we use a third data set for cross country comparisons for 63
developed and less developed countries. However, we do not use this sample for our baseline results
because consistent data on hours of work (as opposed to employment) are not available for most
countries, particularly outside the OECD.
To analyze welfare changes over time for our sample of advanced countries, we combine data
coming from the OECD Statistical Database with the EU-KLEMS dataset.29 Our index of absorp-
tion is constructed from the OECD dataset as the weighted growth of household nal consumption,
gross capital formation and government consumption (where appropriate) at constant national
prices, using as weights their respective nominal shares of absorption. Since our theory requires
steady-state shares, we use the averages of the observed shares across the twenty years in our
sample.
The growth rate of our modied productivity residual is constructed as the log-change in real
absorption minus the log changes in capital and labor, each weighted by its income share out of
absorption. Data on aggregate production inputs are provided by EU-KLEMS. The capital stock
is constructed by applying the perpetual inventory method to investment data. Labor input is
the total amount of hours worked by persons engaged. To obtain per-capita quantities, we divide
absorption, capital, and labor by total population. We assume that economic prots are zero in
the steady-state so that we can recover the gross (tax unadjusted) share of capital as one minus
the labor share.
In order to compare welfare across countries, we combine data from the Penn World Tables
with hours data from EU-KLEMS dataset. Specically, our basic measure of real absorption is
constructed from the Penn World Tables as the weighted average of PPP-converted log private
consumption, log gross investment and log government consumption, using as weights their respec-
tive shares of absorption in the reference country; as in the within case, we use shares that are
averaged across the twenty years in our sample.
To construct the modied log productivity residual for each country, we subtract share weighted
log capital and labor from log real absorption. The shares are the compensation of each input out
of absorption in the reference country, also in this case kept constant at their average values. The
stock of capital in the economy is constructed using the perpetual-inventory method on the PPP-
converted investment time series from the Penn World Tables. Labour input is total hours worked,
from EU-KLEMS.
For the comparative welfare calculations in the 63 country sample, absorption, capital, and
the factor shares are constructed exactly as before. Since consistent data on hours of work are
not available for most countries, we use, as an imperfect proxy for total labor input, aggregate
employment from the ILOs Key Indicators database.30 In this broader sample, we included all
29The EU-KLEMS data are extensively documented by OMahony and Timmer (2009). We are unable to include
Germany in the sample, since o¢ cial data for unied Germany are available only since 1995 in EU-KLEMS.
30The ILO provides two di¤erent measures of total employment. The rst gathered at the national level by
statistical services and ministries. Data coverage starts in 1980 but di¤erences in the denition of employment make
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countries for which su¢ cient data were available to reconstruct TFP for at least 20 years (1985-
2005).
For the empirical exercises including human capital, we construct per-capita human capital
stocks as in Caselli (2005, p. 685-686), using the Barro and Lee (2010) data on average years of
schooling of the population over 25 years of age. The source reports data at 5-year intervals; we
use log-linear interpolation to obtain annual data.
Finally, to take into account of distortionary taxation, we use data on average tax rates on
capital and labor provided by Boscá et al. (2005). The tax rates are computed by combining
realized tax revenues, from the OECD Revenue Statistics, with estimates of the associated tax
bases derived from the OECD National Accounts. These data update the tax rates constructed
by Mendoza et al (1994) and introduce some methodological improvements in their calculation,
most of which are described in Carey and Tchilinguirian (2000). In essence, they involve some
adjustments to the denition of the various tax bases.
5.2 Within Results
We construct country specic indexes of welfare change over time for our seven benchmark countries.
Since the change in welfare over time depends on the expected present discounted value of TFP
growth and its revision, as shown by equation (28), we need to construct forecasts of future TFP. In
order to keep our empirical illustration simple and uniform across countries, we estimate univariate
time-series models using annual data. The extension to a multivariate forecasting framework is
something worth exploring in future work. Our sample period runs from 1985 to 2005 for all
countries except Canada, where the EU-KLEMS data end in 2004.
We use the various aggregate TFP measures suggested by our theory (in log levels), and estimate
simple AR processes for each country. The persistence and trend of TFP growth are key statistics,
since they determine the present discounted value of TFP. For illustration, we report in Table 1
the estimated forecasting equations for two of the four di¤erent denitions of TFP that we use
throughout the paper.
The rst concept is TFP in the case where we assume that government purchases are wasteful,
and taxes are lump-sum. For this case, as discussed above, we construct output by aggregating
consumption and investment only, but using shares that sum to (1  scG), and we do not correct
the capital and labor shares for the e¤ects of distortionary taxes. In this case, the capital and labor
shares sum to one. The second case is the one where we assume government spending is optimally
chosen, but needs to be nanced with distortionary taxes. In this case, the output concept is
the share-weighted sum (in logs) of consumption, investment and government purchases, and the
capital and labor shares are corrected for both income taxes and indirect taxes. After-tax shares
this measure not comparable across countries. The second one, instead, provides a standardized measure across
countries but is only available only starting from 1991. In constructing the modied productivity residual we use
both measures. We use the rst one when constructing the TFP measure used to estimate country-specic time-series
model (gaps for some countries are lled with log-linear interpolations). We use the second one when calculating
welfare di¤erences across countries for 2005.
27
are now smaller and no longer sum to one. Note that in both cases the output concept measures
absorption rather than GDP (unless the economy is closed, in which case the two concepts coincide).
Thus, following our discussion in Section 3.4, all the TFP measures that we use in our analysis are
appropriate for measuring welfare in open economies. In all cases, we assume that pure economic
prots are zero in the steady state.
For all countries, the log level of TFP is well described by either an AR(1) or AR(2) stationary
process around a linear trend. In Table 1 we report the estimation results obtained using the two
denitions of TFP stated above, together with the Lagrange Multiplier test for residual rst order
serial correlation (shown in the last line of each panel in the table), conrming that we cannot reject
the null of no serial correlation for the preferred specication for each country. For all countries,
the order of the estimated AR process is invariant to the TFP measure used. In all cases, we can
comfortably reject the null of a unit root in the log TFP process (after allowing for a time trend).
We use the estimated AR processes to form expectations of future levels or di¤erences of TFP,
which are required to construct our welfare indexes.
We use equation (28) to express the average welfare change per year in each country in terms
of changes in equivalent consumption. Given the time-series processes for TFP in each country,
we can readily construct the rst two terms in equation (28), the present value of expected TFP
growth and the change in expectations of that quantity. The third term, which depends on the
change in the capital stock can also be constructed using data from EU-KLEMS. We assume that
the composite discount rate, ; is common across countries and we set it equal to 0:95:31
The results are in Table 2. We see that assumptions about scal policy a¤ect the results in
signicant ways. We rst illustrate our methods by discussing the results for the US, which are
given in the last row. We then broaden our discussion to draw more general lessons from the full
set of advanced countries.
In the rst column of Table 2, we construct the output data and the capital and labor shares
under the assumption that government expenditure is wasteful and taxes are lump-sum. In this
column, "utility-relevant output" comprises just consumption and investment, aggregated using
weights that sum to less than one. In this case, the average annual growth rate of welfare in the
US is equivalent to a permanent annual increase in consumption of about 2.5 percent.
Now we study the case of optimal government spending, still under the assumption that taxes
are not distortionary. Thus, at the margin the consumer is indi¤erent between an additional unit
of private consumption and an additional unit of government expenditures. In this case, output
consists of consumption, investment and government purchases, aggregated using nominal expendi-
ture shares that sum to one. In a closed economy this concept of TFP corresponds to the standard
Solow residual.
Welfare growth for the US is only slightly higher when we assume that expenditures are optimal:
2.6 versus 2.5 percent for the lump-sum tax cases. (We will see that this result is not universal
within our sample of countries.) On the whole, the di¤ering assumptions about the value of
31We construct our measure of  following the method of Cooley and Prescott (1995), who nd  = 0:947.
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government expenditure do not change the calculated US growth rate of welfare signicantly. Note,
however, that this result does not mean that the US consumer is indi¤erent between wasteful and
optimal government spending. The level of welfare is surely much lower in the case where the
government wastes 20 percent of GDP. However, our results show that the di¤erence in welfare in
the two cases is almost entirely a level di¤erence rather than a growth rate di¤erence.
We repeat our welfare calculations under the assumption that the government raises revenue
via distortionary taxes. The results are in columns 3 and 4 of Table 2. As shown above, if taxes
are distortionary we need to construct the factor shares in the Solow residual using the after-tax
wage and capital rental rate perceived by the household. We construct the new shares using the
tax rates described in the previous section. The quantitative e¤ect of this change is signicant. In
both of the cases we consider (wasteful spending and optimal spending), per-capita welfare growth
expressed in terms of consumption growth rates is higher by nearly half a percentage point per
year. Intuitively, if taxes are distortionary then steady-state output is too low; thus, any increase in
output, even with unchanged technology, is a welfare improvement. It is quantitatively important
to allow for the fact that taxes are distortionary and not lump-sum. For the US, it matters more
for the growth rate of welfare than whether we assume that government spending is wasteful or
optimal. We take as our benchmark the case shown in the last column, where spending is optimally
chosen (from the point of view of the household) and taxes are distortionary. In this case, average
US welfare growth is equivalent to a growth rate of per-capita consumption of 3 percent per year.
Assumptions about scal policy naturally matter more in countries with a high rate of growth
of government purchases per-capita and with a high growth rate of factor inputs. For example,
both facts are true for Spain over our sample period. The growth rate of welfare in Spain nearly
doubles from the rst column, where its 2.1 percent annual welfare growth rate is literally middling,
to the last, where its 4 percent growth rate is the highest among all the countries in our sample.
Assumptions about scal policy also matter signicantly for Canada and Japan, and change the
welfare growth rates of these countries by a full percentage point or more. In percentage terms,
the change is particularly dramatic for Canada. Under three of the four scenarios, the UK leads
our sample of countries in welfare growth rates; in the last case, it is basically tied with Spain.
Finally, we show the full time series of the welfare indexes for each country graphically, for
our two benchmark cases of wasteful spending with lump-sum taxes and optimal spending with
distortionary taxes. In Figures 3 and 4 we report the evolution over time of our welfare indexes
for each country, in log deviations from their values in 1985. In Figure 3, the UK is the clear
growth leader, with France and the US nearly tied in a second group, and Canada trailing badly.
In Figure 4, by contrast, there are three clear groups: the UK and Spain lead, by a considerable
margin; the US, France, and Japan comprise the middle group; Italy and Canada have the lowest
welfare growth rates. Two countries show signicant declines in growth rates, both starting in
the early 1990s. The rst is Japan, which in the rst few years of our sample grew in line with
the leading economies, Spain and the UK, and then slowly drifted down in growth rate to end the
sample in the middle group, with France and the US. Similarly, Italy used to grow at the pace
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of the middle group, but then experienced a slowdown which, by the end of the sample, caused
it to leave the middle group and form a low-growth group with Canada. Thus, our results are
consistent with the general impression that Italy and Japan experienced considerable declines in
economic performance over the last two decades relative to the performance in the earlier postwar
period.
In Table 3, we investigate which of the two components of welfareTFP growth or capital
accumulationcontributed more to the growth rate of welfare in our sample of countries. For the
purpose of this decomposition, we treat the expectation-revision term as a contribution to TFP. In
order to keep the table uncluttered, we drop the case where government spending is optimal and
taxes are lump sum. The rst column, in which government spending is wasteful and taxes are
treated as lump-sum, shows that four of the seven countries have achieved two-thirds or more of
their welfare gains mostly via TFP growth. The exceptions are the three countries that are known
to have had low TFP growth over our sample period: Japan, Canada, and Spain. Moving to the case
of distortionary taxes raises the TFP contribution (by reducing the factor shares), as does changing
the treatment of public spending as optimal rather than wasteful (which raises the growth rate of
output, and thus TFP). In the case of optimal spending with distortionary taxes, all countries get
a majority of their welfare growth from TFP. Only in Japan and Canada is the contribution of
TFP to welfare less than 70 percent, and in most cases it is 75 percent or more.
We next check the robustness of the previous results to the inclusion of human capital. As
discussed in section 3.7, this implies that labor input growth must be adjusted for the growth
of human capital in calculating productivity growth. In addition, equivalent consumption growth
must also take into account the growth of the initial human capital stock per capita. The results, for
the case of optimal spending with distortionary taxes, are shown in Figure 5. Qualitatively, there
is little change relative to the results without human capital. The UK and Spain are still bunched
at the top, followed by France, the U.S. and Japan, with the latter two countries virtually on par
at the end of the sample period. As before, Italy and Canada lag behind the rest of countries.
Overall, the results look very similar to our baseline case.
Finally, we compare the results we have just obtained using our theory-based welfare metric to
those implied by standard proxies for welfare change. In Table 4, we present the average growth rates
of GDP and consumption per-capita for our group of countries over our sample period, as well as the
average growth rate of our baseline welfare measure, which assumes optimal government spending
and distortionary taxes. The di¤erences in magnitude are substantial, with welfare growing faster
than conventional measures like consumption per capita. We have already remarked that allowing
for public spending in the utility function and for distortionary taxes produces larger growth rates
of welfare (compare Table 2, columns one and four), especially for countries with high rates of
growth of factor inputs and government purchases per capita. Indeed, there are smaller gaps
(in absolute value) between our welfare index and the conventional ones when we assume that
government spending is wasteful and taxes are lump sum.
There are two more factors that account for the di¤erence, namely the forward-looking nature of
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our calculations and the presence of leisure in the utility function. To highlight the role of former,
we report in column four of Table 4 our baseline measure calculated assuming that productivity
in each country is forecasted to grow at the US rate in the future. We see that Canada, Italy and
Japan, countries where productivity was growing more slowly than in the US over the sample period,
improve in terms of welfare growth, while the UK, where productivity was growing faster, worsens.
Finally, in column ve of Table 4 we redo our calculations assuming that leisure does not enter
the utility function.32 Note that average labor hours per capita tend to change modestly during
our period, implying that our thought experiment leaves the index of welfare growth unchanged
in most cases. The exception is a small improvement in the welfare index for Spain and Canada,
where average hours worked experienced a more sizeable increase, and a worsening of the index for
Japan, where average labor hours contracted. We shall see that the treatment of leisure in utility
is of greater importance in the cross-country comparisons, where it is its level relative to the US
that matters.
5.3 Cross Country Results
We now turn to measuring welfare di¤erences across the countries in our sample. For each country
and time period, we calculate the welfare gap between that country and the US, as dened in
equation (30). Recall that this gap is the loss in welfare of a representative US household that is
moved permanently to country i starting at time t, expressed as the log gap between equivalent
consumption at home and abroad. In this hypothetical move, the household loses the per-capita
capital stock of the US, but gains the equivalent capital stock of country i. From time t on, the
household faces the same product and factor prices and tax rates, and receives the same lump-
sum transfers and government expenditure benets as all the other households in country i. In a
slight abuse of language, we often refer to the incremental equivalent consumption as the welfare
di¤erenceor the welfare gap.
Note that these gaps are all from the point of view of a US household. Hence, all the shares in
(30), even those used to construct output and TFP growth in country i, are the US shares. This
naturally raises the question whether our results would be quite di¤erent if we took a di¤erent
country as our baseline. We return to this issue after presenting our basic set of results.33
We present numerical results in Table 5. Since the size of the gap varies over time, we present
the gap at the beginning of our sample, at the end of our sample, and averaged over the sample
period. We present results for three cases: wasteful spending, with lump-sum and distortionary
taxes, and optimal spending with distortionary taxes. These numerical magnitudes are useful
references in the discussion that follows.
However, the results are easiest to understand in graphical form. We plot the welfare gap for
32We continue to use the country-specic dynamics estimated in the case where leisure is valued, in order to avoid
changing both the treatment of leisure and the dynamics at the same time.
33We conjecture that if we took a second-order approximation to the welfare gap, then the shares in our computation
would be averages of the shares in the two countries, and hence bilateral comparisons would be invariant to the choice
of a reference country. We leave the investigation of this hypothesis to future research.
31
the countries and time periods in our sample in Figures 6 and 7. Note that by denition the
gap is zero for the US, since the US household neither gains nor loses by moving to the US at
any point in time. The vertical axis shows, therefore, the gain to the US household of moving to
any of the other countries at any point in the sample period, expressed in log points of equivalent
consumption. Figure 6 shows the results for the case of wasteful spending and lump-sum taxes.
Figure 7 shows the results for our benchmark case, where we allow for distortionary taxes and
assume that government expenditure is optimally chosen. Since both gures show qualitatively
similar results, for brevity we discuss only the benchmark case.
It is instructive to begin by focusing on the beginning and end of the sample. At the beginning
of the sample, expected lifetime welfare in both France and the UK was about 20 percent lower than
in the US (gaps of 16 and 19 percent, respectively). This relatively small gap reects both the long-
run European advantage in leisure and the fact that in the mid-1980s the US was still struggling
with its productivity slowdown, while TFP in the leading European economies was growing faster
than in the US. Capital accumulation was also proceeding briskly in those countries. By the end
of the sample, the continental European economies, Canada and Japan are generally falling behind
the US, because they had not matched the pickup in TFP growth and investment experienced in
the US after 1995. Italy experiences the greatest relative reversal of fortune,ending up with a
welfare gap of nearly 50 percent relative to the US. The results for France are qualitatively similar,
but far less extreme. France starts with a welfare gap of 16 percent, and slowly slips further
behind, ending with a gap of 21 percent. In continental Europe, only Spain shows convergence to
the US in terms of welfare: it starts with a gap of 41 percent, and ends with a gap of 36 percent.
However, after 1995 Spain holds steady relative to the US, but does not gain further.
The only economy in our sample that exhibits convergence to the US throughout our sample
is the UK. Indeed, as Figure 6 shows, under the assumption of wasteful spending and lump-sum
taxes, the UK overtakes the US by the end of our sample period. Table 5 and Figure 7 show that
in more realistic cases where taxes are assumed to be distortionary the welfare level of the UK
is always below that of the US, but the UK shows strong convergence, slicing two-thirds o¤ the
welfare gap in two decades. This result is interesting, because the UK experienced much the same
lack of TFP growth in the late 1990s and early 2000s as the major continental European economies.
However, the UK had very rapid productivity growth from 1985 to 1995. The other Anglo-Saxon
country in our sample, Canada, had a welfare level about 30 percent below that of the US in 1985,
but the welfare gap had grown by an additional 50 percent by the end of the sample. This result
is due primarily to the di¤erential productivity performance of the two countries: TFP in Canada
actually fell during the 1990s, and rose only slowly in the early 2000s.
Perhaps the most striking comparison is between the US and Japan. Even in 1985, when its
economic performance was the envy of much of the world, Japan was the least attractive country
in our sample to a US household contemplating emigration; such a household would give up nearly
50 percent of consumption permanently in order to stay in the US instead of moving to Japan.
However, like the UK and Spain, Japan was closing the gap with the US until the start of its lost
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decadein 1991. The relative performance of the three countries changes dramatically from that
point: unlike the UK, which continues to catch up, and Spain, which holds steady, Japan begins to
fall behind the US, rst slowly and then more rapidly. Having closed to within 43 percent of the
US welfare level in 1991, Japan ends our sample 53 percent behind.
As we did for the within-country results, we investigate whether the cross-country welfare gaps
are driven mostly by the TFP gap or by di¤erences in capital per worker. The results are shown
in Table 6. We focus on the last column of Panel C, which gives results averaged over the full
sample period for our baseline case of optimal spending with distortionary taxes. We nd that for
ve of the six countries, TFP is responsible for the vast majority of the welfare gap relative to the
US. Indeed, for Japan TFP accounts for more than 100 percent of the gap (meaning that Japan
has generally had a higher level of capital per person than the US). Thus we arrive at much the
same conclusion as Hall and Jones (1999), although our denition of TFP is quite di¤erent from
the one they used, and we do not focus only on steady-state di¤erences. The exception to this
rule is the UK. The average welfare gap between the US and the UK is driven about equally by
TFP and by capital. Panel B shows that by the end of the sample, the UK had surpassed the US
in "welfare-relevant TFP," and more than 100 percent of the gap was driven by the di¤erence in
per-capita capital between the two economies.
We now check the robustness of the preceding results along three dimensions. First, as noted
above, we wish to see whether our welfare ranking is sensitive to the choice of the reference country.
We thus redo the preceding exercises taking France as the baseline country. France is the largest
and most successful continental European economy in our sample, and by revealed preference French
households place much higher weight on leisure than do US ones. We summarize the results for our
baseline case of optimal spending with distortionary taxes in Figure 8. For ease of comparison with
the preceding cross-country gures, we still normalize the US welfare level to zero throughout, even
though the comparison is done from the perspective of the French household and is based on French
shares. Reassuringly, we see that the qualitative results are unchanged. France and the UK start
closest to the US in 1985, but even they are well behind the US level of welfare. The UK converges
towards the US welfare level and so, from a much lower starting point, does Spain. All the other
economies, including France, fall steadily farther behind the US over time. Interestingly, from the
French point of view almost all the other countries are shifted down vis-a-vis the US relative to the
rankings from the US point of view.
In our second robustness check, we bring human capital into the analysis. From the derivation
in section 3.6, this may change our welfare results for two reasons. First, countries may di¤er in
their initial human capital stocks. Second, the series for labor input is now adjusted for human
capital. Notice that the rst of these two factors comes into play only to the extent that the
hypothetical move of the household from the reference country (the US) to country i entails losing
her initial human capital stock and acquiring the human capital capital stock of country i. In
principle, there is no compelling reason why the thought experiment should be framed in this way,
rather than allowing the US household to retain the US human capital stock when moving to
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country i. However, for comparability with the development accounting literature, which assigns a
prominent role to cross-country di¤erences in human capital stocks, we opt for assuming that the
US household does not retain its human capital with when moving to the comparator country.
The results from repeating the previous exercises bringing human capital into our framework are
shown in Figure 9, for our baseline case of optimal spending with distortionary taxes. Comparison
with Figure 7 above, which portrays the baseline case without human capital, reveals that the
welfare gap with respect to the US is now wider for all countries. However, the magnitude of the
change varies across countries. It is especially large for Spain and France, and more modest for the
other countries. Further comparison with Figure 7 also shows that the slopes of the various lines
are fairly similar across the two gures, so the widening of welfare gaps is roughly the same with
or without human capital. At the beginning of the sample period, Spain now shows the largest
welfare gap relative to the US, and the UK the smallest one (when ignoring human capital, Japan
and France respectively assumed those roles). At the end of the sample period, Spain is behind all
countries except Italy, while the relative ranking of the remaining countries is the same as in the
case without human capital.
Finally, as we did for the results on within-country welfare growth, we compare our welfare
results to those based on traditional measures, namely PPP-adjusted GDP and consumption per
capita. The results are in Table 7. Focusing on Panel B, for the nal year of our sample, we see
that the three measures sometimes give identical results. For example, the US is atop the world
rankings by all three measures, although the gap between the US and the second-ranked country is
much smaller in percentage terms for welfare (6 percent) than it is for the other two variables (18 or
19 percent). On the other hand, the di¤erences can be striking. For example, Canada, which leads
Spain by 20 percent or more in terms of consumption and GDP per capita, is overtaken by Spain
and France in our welfare comparison. Indeed, Spain is last within our group of countries in terms
of the conventional metrics of consumption and GDP, but ranks fourth in welfare terms, trailing
only the US, UK and France. For the other countries, the welfare measure is not so kind. Japan
trails the US by only 26 percent in GDP per capita, but double that 52 percent in terms of
welfare. Similarly, Italy has more than 60 percent of the per-capita GDP of the US, but only about
one-third the welfare level. On the other hand, France trails the US by 40 percent in consumption
per-capita, but by only half that amount in terms of a welfare. Thus, our measure clearly provides
new information on welfare di¤erences among countries.
Relative to the traditional indexes of country performance, two new factors we highlight are
dynamics (the expectation of future productivity change) and the treatment of leisure. To show
their importance for cross-country di¤erences in welfare, we have recalculated our basic index
assuming, rst, that future levels of productivity in all countries are expected to grow at the US
rate, and second by assuming that leisure does not enter the utility function. The results appear
in the last two columns of Table 7. When we assume that future productivity in each country is
expected to grow at the US rate, the signicant changes occur for Italy, Canada, and the UK: the
performance of Canada and Italy, whose productivity growth trails that of the US, improves, while
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the performance of the UK, with faster productivity growth than the US, worsens. When, instead,
di¤erences in leisure are not taken into account in the calculation of the index, Italy, France and
Spain, with much lower average hours of work per capita than the US, worsen even more in terms
of welfare relative to the US.
5.4 A broader cross-country sample
The empirical exercises so far are limited to a small set of large advanced countries, determined by
the availability of the requisite data. However, it may be interesting to assess welfare gaps across
countries in a broader sample, including both advanced and developing countries.
Thus, as a nal empirical exercise, we extend our cross-country results to a large set of countries
for the year 2005. As noted, however, consistent information on hours worked is almost completely
unavailable for countries outside the OECD. Hence, as already mentioned, we measure the aggregate
labor input using total employment rather than total hours. The immediate consequence is that
cross-country di¤erences in work hours per person are ignored in the calculation of cross-country
di¤erences in the productivity residual, and thus also in the calculation of di¤erences in welfare.34
As with the smaller country sample, we calculated the welfare gaps (always from the perspective
of the US household) under di¤erent assumptions regarding public spending and taxation, and both
including human capital and excluding it. In each case, we estimated country-specic autoregressive
models and used them to project the future path of the relevant version of the modied productivity
residual. For the sake of space, we only report the results of our baseline specication optimal
government expenditure and distortionary taxes for the human capital-augmented model. Except
for the di¤erent measurement of the labor input, the exercise is therefore the same as that reported
in Figure 9, but it now includes 63 countries.
Results appear in Table 8. The rst column reports the log di¤erences in per capita welfare
vis-a-vis the US for the year 2005. Only Luxembourg ranks ahead of the US, the same result
found by Jones and Klenow (2010) using a di¤erent welfare metric. All the industrial countries in
the sample rank above the median, with Italy bringing up the rear in 30th place. Among the six
advanced countries in our earlier exercises, relative ranks are the same as those shown in Figure 9,
with the only exception being that Spain and Japan trade places, although their respective welfare
gaps are numerically very similar (as was the case also in Figure 9).
In turn, most developing countries exhibit fairly large welfare gaps relative to the US. Translat-
ing the log-di¤erences shown in the table to percentage terms, we nd that a US household moving
to South Korea would su¤er a welfare loss equivalent to 40 percent of her permanent consump-
tion. Moving instead to Mexico or China would raise the loss above 85 percent of consumption.
In addition, inspection of 2005 per capita GDP data (not shown in the table) reveals that, of the
61 sample countries that trail the US in terms of welfare, the vast majority (57 of them) lag fur-
34Recall that, aside from absorption and labor and capital aggregates for the countries involved, numerical com-
parisons of welfare across countries only require information on factor shares and tax rates for the reference country
(which continues to be the US for this exercise).
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ther behind in terms of welfare than in per-capita GDP. For these countries, the median di¤erence
between the two gaps (in percentage terms) equals 10 percent. In addition, for the six advanced
non-US countries in our earlier exercises, the 2005 welfare gaps in Table 8 are in all cases larger
than those shown in Figure 9. We conjecture that ignoring cross-country di¤erences in hours of
work as we are e¤ectively doing in the enlarged country sample may lead, for most countries,
to an overestimation of the present value of their labor input relative to the US, and thereby to an
overestimation of their respective welfare lag vis-a-vis the US.35
As before, we may ask how these welfare-based country comparisons would relate to those
obtained on the basis of per capita consumption or GDP. The answer is that the resulting country
ranking would show visible di¤erences for example, Norway had higher PPP GDP per capita than
the US in 2005, but, according to the results in Table 8, lower welfare. In contrast, Luxembourg
ranks ahead of the US in terms of welfare, but not in terms of consumption per capita (at PPP
prices) in 2005. On the whole, however, there is broad agreement among the three measures.
Indeed, the correlation coe¢ cients between the log di¤erences in welfare shown in Table 8, and the
log di¤erences in per capita PPP GDP or consumption (both vis-a-vis the US) observed in 2005,
equal 0.93 and 0.90, respectively. One factor behind this high correlation is probably the lack of
data on hours worked for this larger sample, which forces us to ignore the variation in average
hours per employee across countries. Perhaps this should not be surprising since, in data sets with
a large sample of countries, one cannot account for di¤erences in average hours worked by those
employed.36 It is interesting to note that for the set of countries we consider, the cross-country
correlation between the welfare measure (based on ow utility) employed by Jones and Klenow
(2010) and (log) PPP GDP per capita is also high (0.95).
Lastly, we examine the extent to which the 2005 cross-country welfare gaps shown in the rst
column of Table 8 are driven by di¤erences in TFP and by di¤erences in initial capital (both
physical and human) per worker. The relevant decomposition is shown in the second and third
columns of Table 8. On the whole, TFP accounts for the bulk of the welfare di¤erences. In 56
out of the 61 countries that trail the US in terms of welfare, TFP accounts for over two-thirds of
the welfare gap. Across countries, its median contribution equals 79 percent. An extreme case is
Norway, whose welfare gap is entirely due to TFP, with part of the gap o¤set by an initial capital
stock above that of the US. At the other extreme, the UK is the only country whose welfare gap
relative to the US is fully due to its lower initial capital stock.
6 Relationship to the Literature
Measuring welfare change over time and di¤erences across countries using observable national in-
come accounts data has been a long-standing challenge for economists. We note here the similarities
35For the countries with data, the correlation between total employment and total hours of work (both in logs) is
0.53, which conrms that the former is a fairly noisy proxy for the latter.
36For the sample of seven advanced countries, where we have both hours and employment data, the correlation of
GDP per capita with equivalent consumption, correctly computed using total hours, is 0.59. If equivalent consumption
is computed, instead, using employment data, the correlation rises to 0.77.
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and di¤erences between our approach and ones that have been taken before. We also suggest ways
in which our results might be useful in other elds of economics, where the same question arises in
di¤erent contexts.
Nordhaus and Tobin (1972) originated one approach, which is to take a snapshot of the econ-
omys ow output at a point in time and then go beyond GDP, by adjusting GDP in various
ways to make it a better ow measure of welfare. Nordhaus and Tobin found that the largest gap
between ow output and ow welfare comes from the value that consumers put on leisure. Their
result motivated us to add leisure to the period utility function in our model, which is standard
in business-cycle analysis but not in growth theory. Nordhaus and Tobins approach has been fol-
lowed recently by Jones and Klenow (2010) who add other corrections, notably for life expectancy
and inequality. However, this point-in-time approach does not take into account the link between
todays choices and future consumption or leisure possibilities. For example, high consumption in
the measured period might denote either permanently high welfare or low current investment. Low
investment would mean that consumption must fall in the future, so its current level would not
be a good indicator of long-term welfare. Our approach is to go beyond point-in-time measures of
welfare and compute the expected present discounted value of consumersentire sequence of period
utility. Moreover, the intertemporal nature of our approach allows us to frame an appealing thought
experiment for cross-country comparisons, where the household of a reference country re-optimizes
when faced with the path of exogenous variables of another country.
Our approach echoes the methods used in the literature started by Weitzman (1976) and
analyzed in depth by Weitzman (2003), with notable contributions from many other authors.37
This literature also relates the welfare of an innitely lived representative agent to observables; for
example, Weitzman (1976) linked intertemporal welfare to net domestic product (NDP). Unlike our
model which allows for uncertainty about the future, this literature almost always assumes perfect
foresight.38 Allowing for uncertainty is important when forward-looking rules for measurement are
applied to actual data. More importantly, the results in these papers are derived using a number
of strong restrictions on the nature of technology (typically an aggregate production function with
constant returns to scale), product market competition (always assumed to be perfect), and the
allowed number of variables that are exogenous functions of time, such as technology or terms of
trade (usually none, but sometimes one or two). Most of the analysis in the literature applies to
a closed economy where growth is optimal.39 Taken together, this long list of assumptions greatly
limits the domain of applicability of the results.
By contrast, we derive all our results based only on rst-order conditions from household op-
timization, which allows for imperfect competition in product markets of an arbitrary type and
37A far from exhaustive list includes Asheim (1994), Arronson and Löfgren (1995), Mino (2004), Sefton and Weale
(2006), Basu, Pascali, Schiantarelli and Serven (2009), and Hulten and Schreyer (2010). Reis (2005) analyses the
related problem of computing a dynamic measure of ination for a long-lived representative consumer.
38Arronson and Löfgren (1995) allow for stochastic population growth, and Weitzman (2003, ch. 6) considers
shocks coming from stochastic depreciation of capital.
39Sefton and Weale (2006) and Hulten and Schreyer (2010) consider an open economy with changes in the terms
of trade and Mino (2004) analyses Marshallian spillovers to R&D (all under perfect foresight).
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for a vast range of production possibilities, with no assumption that they can be summarized by
an aggregate production function or a convex technology set. (This makes it easy to apply our
results to modern trade and macro models, for example, since these models often assume imperfect
competition with substantial producer heterogeneity.) We do not need to assume that the economy
follows an optimal growth path. We are also able to allow for a wide range of shocks, including but
not limited to changes in technology, tax rates, terms of trade, government purchases, the size of
Marshallian spillovers, monetary policy, tari¤s, and markups.40 Crucially, we do not need to specify
the sources of structural shocks to the economy. The key to the generality of our results is that
we condition on observed prices and asset stocks without needing to model why these quantities
take on the values that they do.41 To our knowledge, in the literature started by Weitzman (1976),
this paper is the rst to produce empirical measures of intertemporal welfare in a framework that
allows productivity to vary over time.
Our results shed light on a variety of issues that bedevil the measurement of productivity
and allocative e¢ ciency. For example, Baker and Rosnick (2007), reasoning that the ultimate
object of growth is consumption, make the reasonable conjecture that one should deate nominal
productivity gains by a consumption price index to create a measure they call usable productivity.
We begin from the assumption that consumption (and leisure) at di¤erent dates are the only inputs
to economic wellbeing, but nevertheless show that output should be calculated in the conventional
way, rather than being deated by consumer prices.
Our work claries and unies several results in other literatures, especially international eco-
nomics. Kohli (2004) shows in a static setting that terms-of-trade changes can improve welfare in
open economies even when technology is constant. Kehoe and Ruhl (2008) prove a related result
in a dynamic model with balanced trade: opening to trade may increase welfare, even if it does
not change TFP. In these models, which assume competition and constant returns, technology is
equivalent to TFP. We generalize and extend these results, and show that in a dynamic environment
with unbalanced trade welfare can also change if there are changes in the quantity of net foreign
assets or in their rates of return.42 In general, we show that there is a link between observable
aggregate data and welfare in an open economy, which is the objective of Bajona, Gibson, Kehoe
and Ruhl (2010). While we agree with the conclusion of these authors that GDP is not a su¢ cient
statistic for uncovering the e¤ect of trade policy on welfare, we show that one can construct such
a su¢ cient statistic by considering a relatively small number of other variables. Our results also
40See also Sandleris and Wright (2011) for an attempt to extend the basic ideas in Basu and Fernald (2002) in
order to evaluate the welfare e¤ects of nancial crises. These papers try to derive methods to measure the welfare
e¤ects of a particular shock, which requires specifying an explicit counterfactual path that the economy would have
followed in the absence of the shock.
41We do need to forecast the present value of future TFP in order to implement our results in data. It is an
open question whether specifying a complete general-equilibrium structure for the model would improve our forecasts
substantially. We decided that the possible gain in forecasting accuracy from specifying a general-equilibrium structure
would not compensate for the loss of generality of our results.
42The result that openness does not change TFP may be fragile in models with increasing returns. If opening to
trade changes factor inputs, either on impact or over time, then TFP as measured by Solows residual will change as
well, which we show has an e¤ect on welfare even holding constant the terms of trade.
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shed light on the work of Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2012). These authors show
that in a class of modern trade models, which includes models with imperfect competition and
micro-level productivity heterogeneity, one can construct measures of the welfare gain from trade
without reference to micro data.43 Our results imply that this conclusion actually holds in a much
larger class of models, although the exact functional form of the result in Arkolakis et al. (2012)
may not. Finally, since changes in net foreign asset positions and their rates of return are extremely
hard to measure, we show that one can measure welfare using data only on TFP and the capital
stock, even in an open economy, provided that TFP is calculated using absorption rather than
GDP as the output concept.
Our work provides a di¤erent view of a large and burgeoning literature that investigates the
productivity di¤erences across countries. If we specialize our cross-country result to the lump
sum taxes-optimal spending case, we obtain something closely related to the results produced
by the development accounting literature. We show that in that case, (the present value of)
the log di¤erences in TFP levels emphasized by the developing accounting literature need to be
supplemented with only one additional variable, namely log level gaps in capital per person, in
order to serve as a measure of welfare di¤erences among countries.44
A number of recent papers suggest that countries can increase output and TFP substantially by
allocating resources more e¢ ciently across rms. Our work implies that the literature is correct to
focus on the connection between reallocation and aggregate TFP. An increase in aggregate TFP due
to reallocation is as much of a welfare gain for the representative consumer as a change in technology
with the same magnitude and persistence. This result implies immediately that estimates of TFP
losses due to allocative ine¢ ciency (e.g., Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) can be translated to estimates
of welfare losses.
Our results are also related to an earlier literature on industrial policy. and to more recent
literature on the e¤ect of "reallocation". Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969) and Bulow
and Summers (1986) argue welfare would be enhanced by policies to promote growth in industries
where there are rents, for example stemming from monopoly power.45 The TFP term in Proposition
1 or 1captures this e¤ect. When rms have market power, their output grows faster than the
share-weighted sum of their inputs, even when their technology is constant. Thus, aggregate TFP
rises when rms with above-average market power grow faster than average. At rst this result
sounds counterintuitive, since it implies that welfare is enhanced by directing more capital and
labor to the most distorted sectors. However, the logic is exactly the same as the usual result that
rms with the greatest monopoly power should also receive the largest unit subsidies to increase
their output.
43Atkeson and Burstein (2010) come to similar conclusions in a related model.
44As we show, what matters is the present discounted value of TFP di¤erences. Moreover, one needs to compute
TFP using di¤erent shares than the ones used by the development accounting literature, and switch to a di¤erent
output concept (based on domestic absorption) in an open economy.
45A second-best policy might involve trade restrictions to protect such industries from foreign competition. If
lump-sum taxes are available, the optimal policy is always to target the distortion directly through a tax-cum-subsidy
scheme.
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Finally, our work is closely related to the program of developing su¢ cient statistics for welfare
analysis, surveyed by Chetty (2009). We have proposed such a statistic for a representative con-
sumer in a macroeconomic context. As Chetty notes, such measures can be used to evaluate the
e¤ects of policies. Suppose that one wishes to evaluate the e¤ect of a policy change for example,
a change in trade policy, as in Kehoe and Ruhl (2010). The usual method is to relate the policy
change to a variety of economic indicators, such as GDP, capital accumulation, or the trade bal-
ance, and then try to relate the indicators to welfare informally. Our work suggests that one can
dispense with these intermediate targets,and just directly relate the welfare outcome to a change
in policy, or to some other shock.
7 Conclusions
We show that aggregate TFP, appropriately dened, and the capital stock can be used to construct
su¢ cient statistics for the welfare of a representative consumer. To a rst order approximation,
welfare is measured by the expected present value of aggregate TFP and by the initial capital
stock. This result holds regardless of the type of production technology and the degree of product
market competition, and applies to closed or open economies with or without distortionary taxation.
Crucially, TFP has to be calculated using prices faced by households rather than prices facing
rms. In modern economies with high rates of income and indirect taxation, the gap between
household and rm TFP can be considerable. Finally, in an open economy, the change in welfare
will also reect present and future changes in the returns on net foreign assets and in the terms of
trade. However, these latter terms disappear if absorption rather than GDP is used as the output
concept for constructing TFP, and TFP and the initial capital stock are again su¢ cient statistics
for measuring welfare in open economies. Most strikingly, these variables also su¢ ce to measure
welfare level di¤erences across countries, with both variables computed as log level deviations from
a reference country.
We extend the existing literature on intertemporal welfare measurement by deriving all our
results from household rst-order conditions alone. The generality of our derivation allows us to
propose a new interpretation of TFP that sheds new light on several distinct areas of study. For
instance, we show that measures of cross-country TFP di¤erences akin to those produced by the
development accountingliterature are crucial for calculating welfare di¤erences among countries.
We also nd that readily-available national accounts data can be used to construct welfare measures
for open economies, which can be used to evaluate the e¤ects of trade policies and tari¤ changes.
In general, our results imply that all changes in the Solow residual, whatever their source (for
example, technology, increasing returns, or reallocation) are equally important for welfare.
We illustrate our results by using national accounts data to measure welfare growth rates and
gaps across countries. We nd that the assumptions about scal policy matter for welfare cal-
culations. For instance, Spains welfare growth almost doubles when one allows for distortionary
taxation and optimal government spending. Our evidence also suggests that expectations about
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future productivity and the presence of leisure in the utility function are important determinants
of welfare rankings. Finally, in the vast majority of cases, the bulk of the welfare gap relative to
the US, our welfare leader among large countries, is due to the productivity gap, rather than the
gap in the initial capital stock.
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A Appendix: Derivations and numerical simulations
A.1 Proposition 1
Assume that in the steady state aggregate per capita variables grow at a constant rate g: Thus,
they are proportional to Xt = X0(1 + g)t. Rewrite the utility function, the budget constraint and
the capital accumulation, equations (1), (2) and (3), in normalized form by dividing by Xt :
vt =
1X
s=0
sU(ct+s;L  Lt+s) (A.1)
kt + bt =
(1  ) + pKt
(1 + g) (1 + n)
kt 1 +
(1 + rt)
(1 + g) (1 + n)
bt 1 + pLt Lt + t   pCt ct (A.2)
kt =
(1  )
(1 + g) (1 + n)
kt 1 + it (A.3)
where: vt = Vt
X
(1 )
t
, ct = CtXt kt =
Kt
Xt
, bt = BtP It Xt
, pKt =
PKt
P It
, pLt =
PLt
P It Xt
, pCt =
PCt
P It
; (1 + rt) = 
1 + iBt
 P It 1
P It
, t = tP It Xt
and  = (1+n)(1+g)
1 
(1+) .
The rst order conditions for this problem are:
Uct   tpCt = 0 (A.4)
ULt + tp
L
t = 0 (A.5)
 t + Et
(1  ) + pKt+1
(1 + g) (1 + n)
t+1 = 0 (A.6)
 t +  1
(1 + g) (1 + n)
Et (1 + rt+1)t+1 = 0 (A.7)
where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Dene with bx = xt xx
the percent deviation from the steady-state of a variable (x is the steady-state value of xt). Taking
a rst order approximation of the Lagrangean (which equals the value function along the optimal
path), one obtains:
vt   v = Et[
1X
s=0
s(Uccbct+s + ULLbLt+s
+pLLbLt+s   pCcbct+s   kbkt+s   bbbt+s)
+
1X
s=0
s+1(
(1  ) + pK
(1 + g) (1 + n)
kbkt+s +  (1 + r)
(1 + g) (1 + n)
bbbt+s)
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+1X
s=0
sbt+s ( k   b+ (1  ) + pK
(1 + g) (1 + n)
k +
(1 + r)
(1 + g) (1 + n)
b
+pLL+    pCc)]
+
1X
s=0
s(pLLbpLt+s + pKk(1 + g) (1 + n) bpKt+s   pCt cbpCt+s + bt+s + rb(1 + g) (1 + n)brt+s)
+
(1  ) + pK
(1 + g) (1 + n)
kbkt 1 +  (1 + r)
(1 + g) (1 + n)
bbbt 1 (A.8)
Using the rst-order conditions, the rst ve lines equal zero. Moreover, since we are considering a
closed economy case, in equilibrium bt = 0. Hence we get:
vt = v + Et
1X
s=0
s

pLLbpLt+s + pKk(1 + g) (1 + n) bpKt+s   pCcbpCt+s + bt+s)

+
(1  ) + pK
(1 + g) (1 + n)
kbkt 1 (A.9)
Linearize the budget constraint and the law of motion for capital:
k bkt + bbbt   (1  ) + pK
(1 + g) (1 + n)
kbkt 1   (1 + r)
(1 + g) (1 + n)
bbbt 1   pLLbLt   pLLbpLt   pKk(1 + g) (1 + n)bpKt
  rb
(1 + g) (1 + n)
brt   bt + pCcbct + pCcbpt = 0 (A.10)
kbkt = (1  )
(1 + g) (1 + n)
kbkt 1 + ibit (A.11)
Use (A.10) and (A.11) in (A.9), together with the steady-state version of the FOC for capital. This
yields:
vt = v + Et
1X
s=0
s

pCcbct+s + ibit+s   pKk
(1 + g) (1 + n)
bkt+s 1   pLLbLt+s
+
1

kbkt 1 (A.12)
Take the di¤erence between the expected level of intertemporal utility vt as in (A.12) and vt 1 and
use the fact that: xt xx ' log xt   log x for a positive xt: After adding and subtracting Etxt+s for
each variable xt+s, we obtain:
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vt = Et
1X
s=0
s[pCc log ct+s + i log it   pLL logLt+s   p
Kk
(1 + g) (1 + n)
 log kt+s 1]
+
1X
s=0
s[pCc (Et log ct+s 1   Et 1 log ct+s 1) + i (Et log it+s 1   Et 1 log it+s 1)
+
1

k log kt 1 (A.13)
Dene value added growth (in normalized form) as:
 log yt = sC log ct + sI log it (A.14)
Inserting (A.14) into (A.13) and dividing both terms by pY y one obtains:
v
pY y
vt
v
= Et
1X
s=0
s[ log yt+s   sL logLt+s   sK log kt+s 1] (A.15)
+
1X
s=0
s[(Et log yt+s 1   Et 1 log yt+s 1)
+
1

k
pY y
 log kt 1
The denition of equivalent consumption in terms of normalized variables is:
vt =
1
(1  ) (1  )c
1 
t (L  L) (A.16)
Expanding the right hand side of (A.16) in terms of log ct and using the FOC for consumption, it
follows that:
v
pY y
vt
v
=
sC
1   log c

t (A.17)
Using the result above in equation (A.15) one obtains, to a rst-order approximation:
sC
1   log c

t = Et
1X
s=0
s[ log yt+s   sL logLt+s   sK log kt+s 1] (A.18)
+
1X
s=0
s[(Et log yt+s 1   Et 1 log yt+s 1)
+
1

k
pY y
 log kt 1
Using the fact that  log yt =  log Yt g;  log kt =  logKt g; log ct =  logCt  g, equation
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(A.18) can be rewritten as:
sC
1   logC

t = Et
1X
s=0
s logPRt+s
+
1X
s=0
s [Et logPRt+s 1   Et 1 logPRt+s 1]
+
1

k
pY y
 log
Kt 1
Nt 1
(A.19)
+
sC
1   g  
1
(1  )g(1  sK) 
1

k
pY y
g
where logPRt+s is dened in (6). Using equations (A.6) and (A.3) evaluated at the steady-state,
one can easily show that sC(1 )   1(1 )(1  sK)  1 kpY y = 0, so that the last line in equation (A.19)
equals zero. Multiplying both sides of (A.19) by 1 sC yields Proposition 1 in the main text.
A.2 Proposition 2
Consider the maximization problem of a ctitious household, which has the preferences of a house-
hold in country j and faces the prices and per-capita endowments of a household living in country
i. It maximizes (with variables dened in normalized form):
evit = Et 1X
s=0
s
ecit+s1 (L  eLit+s)
1   (A.20)
subject to:
ekit+s +ebit+s = (1  ) + piKt+s(1 + g) (1 + n)ekit+s 1 +
 
1 + rit

(1 + g) (1 + n)
ebit+s 1 + piLt+seLit+s + it+s   piCt+secit+s (A.21)
where: evt = eVtXit , ecit+s = eCit+sXit+s , ekit = KitXit , ebit = BitP iIt Xit , piKt = P iKtP iIt , piLt = P iLtP iIt Xit , piCt = P iCtP iIt ;
(1 + rt) =

1 + iB;it

P iIt 1
P iIt
and it =
it
P iIt X
i
t
. A tilde denotes the (unobservable) quantities that the
household would choose when facing prices and initial conditions of country i. To simplify the
notation in this proof, all variables without the superscript i denote utility, preference parameters,
quantities and prices in country j. Linearizing around country js steady state and using the
envelope theorem, one obtains:
v
pyy
evit   v
v
= Et
1X
s=0
s[sLbpiLt+s + sK bpiKt+s +sbit+s   sCbpiCt+s + sBbrit+s] (A.22)
+
1

k
pyy
bkit 1 + 1 bpyybbit 1
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Linearize the budget constraint and the law of motion for capital:
k
bekit+s + bbebit+s   (1  ) + pK
(1 + g) (1 + n)
k
bekit+s 1   (1 + r)
(1 + g) (1 + n)
b
bebit+s 1   pLL beLit+s   pLLbpiLt+s
  p
Kk
(1 + g) (1 + n)
bpiKt+s   bit+s + pCcbecit+s + pCcbpiCt+s = 0 (A.23)
k
bekit+s = (1  )
(1 + g) (1 + n)
k
bekit+s 1 + ibeiit+s (A.24)
Using the two equations above in equation (A.22), together with the fact that at t 1, bkit 1 = bekit 1;
we obtain:
v
pyy
evit   v
v
= Et
1X
s=0
s

sC becit+s + sIbeiit+s   sL beLit+s   sK bekit+s 1+ 1

k
pyy
bkit 1 (A.25)
Now consider the budget constraint of a household in country i and the law of motion for capital
in country i, linearized around country js steady state.
k bkit+s + bbbit+s   (1  ) + pK
(1 + g) (1 + n)
k bkit+s 1   (1 + r)
(1 + g) (1 + n)
bbbit+s 1   pLL bLit+s   pLLbpiLt+s
  p
Kk
(1 + g) (1 + n)
bpiKt+s   bt+s + pCcbcit+s + pCcbpiCt+s = 0 (A.26)
k bkit+s = (1  )
(1 + g) (1 + n)
k bkit+s 1 + ibiit+s (A.27)
where kit =
Kit
Xt
, bit =
Bit
P It Xt
, it =
it
P It Xt
and piL = P
iL
t
P It Xt
. Using the two budget constraints in
equations (A.23) and (A.26), the two laws of motion for capital in equations (A.24) and (A.27) and
the fact that bonds are in zero net supply, we obtain:
sC becit+s + sIbeiit+s   sL beLit+s   sK bekit+s 1 = sCbct+s + sIbit+s   sL bLt+s   sK bkt+s 1 (A.28)
which implies that equation (A.25) can be re-written as:
v
pyy
evit   v
v
= Et
1X
s=0
s
h
sCbcit+s + sIbiit+s   sL bLit+s   sK bkit+s 1i+ 1 kpyybkit 1 (A.29)
Similarly, for the household from country j living in country j :
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vpyy
vt   v
v
= Et
1X
s=0
s
h
sCbct+s + sIbit+s   sL bLt+s   sK bkt+s 1i+ 1

k
pyy
bkt 1 (A.30)
Using the fact that exit xx ' log exit   log x for a generic non-negative variable x, and subtracting
equation (A.30) from equation (A.29), we obtain:
v
pyy
evit   vt
v
= Et
1X
s=0
s[sC(log c
i
t+s   log ct+s) + sI(log iit+s   log it+s)
 sL (logLit+s   lnLt+s)  sK(log kit+s 1   log kt+s 1)]
+
1

k
pY y
(log kit 1   log kt 1) (A.31)
Using equation (A.17) and the fact that sC(1 )   1(1 )(1   sK)   1 kpY y = 0, some algebra yields
Proposition 2 in the main text, with the productivity terms dened in (14) and (15).
A.3 Extensions
A.3.1 Government Expenditure
Assume that utility depends upon private consumption and government spending on public con-
sumption, as in equation (20). Assume government expenditure is nanced through a lump-sum
tax (for expositional simplicity). Re-writing the household maximization problem in normalized
variables and proceeding in a similar fashion as in the proof of proposition 1, we obtain:
vt = v + Et
1X
s=0
s

UcGcGbcG;t+s

+ pCcbct+s + ibit+s   pLLbLt+s   pKk
(1 + g) (1 + n)
bkt+s 1
+
1

kbkt 1 (A.32)
where cG;t =
CG;t
Xt
. The log-change in per-capita GDP, in normalized variables is dened as:
 log yt = sC log ct+s + scG log cG;t + sI log it (A.33)
where scG is the steady state value of scG;t =
PGt CG;t
PYt Yt
and PG is the public consumption deator.
Using this result and some algebra, equation (A.32) becomes:
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vpY y
vt
v
= Et
1X
s=0
s[ log yt+s   sL logLt+s   sK log kt+s 1 +
 
scG   scG

 log cG;t]
+
1X
s=0
s[(Et log yt+s 1   Et 1 log yt+s 1)
+
1

k
pY y
 log kt 1 (A.34)
where scG is the steady state value of s

cG;t
=
UcG;tcG;t
t
. From this point, the algebra is very similar
to the benchmark case, and yields (21) and (22) in the main text.
A.3.2 Open Economy
In an open economy, the household continues to maximize equation (A.1) subject to (A.2). Interpret
bt as the stock of foreign assets. As bt can di¤er from zero, (A.9) becomes:
vt = v + Et
1X
s=0
s

pLLbpLt+s + pKk(1 + g) (1 + n) bpKt+s   pCcbpCt+s + bt+s + rb(1 + g) (1 + n)brt+s)

+
(1  ) + pK
(1 + g) (1 + n)
kbkt 1 +  (1 + r)
(1 + g) (1 + n)
bbbt 1 (A.35)
The budget constraint and the law of motion of capital are unchanged with respect to the benchmark
case, and therefore equations (A.2) and (A.3) are still valid.
Using these two equations and the steady-state version of the FOC for capital in (A.9) gives us:
vt = v + Et
1X
s=0
s

pCcbct+s + ibit+s   pK
(1 + g) (1 + n)
kbkt+s 1   pLLbLt+s+  1

kbkt 1
+
1X
s=0
s

bbbt+s    (1 + r)
(1 + g) (1 + n)
bbbt+s (A.36)
Using the FOC and the transversality condition for bonds, the last line in the equation above equals
zero. As a result, the equations obtained for the closed economy hold also for the open economy,
provided the log change of GDP is replaced by the log change in domestic absorption, dened as:
 logAt = sC logCt + sI log It
where sC and sI are shares out of domestic absorption.
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A.3.3 Summing up
Using the extensions developed in A.3.1-A.3.2 and the others described in the text (distortionary
taxes and multiple investment and consumption goods) we can state Proposition 1. A parallel
argument can be used to derive the generalization of Proposition 2, Proposition 2.
A.4 Human capital
As in Lucas (1988), assume that non-leisure time can be used either to work or to accumulate
human capital. The representative household maximizes intertemporal utility:
Wt =
1X
s=0
1
(1 + )s
Nt+s
H
U(Ct+s;L  Lt+s   Et+s) (A.37)
where Et denotes the amount of time devoted to human capital accumulation, under the following
budget constraint:
P It KtNt+BtNt = (1  )P It Kt 1Nt 1+
 
1 + iBt

Bt 1Nt 1+PLt LtHt 1Nt+P
K
t Kt 1Nt 1+tNt PCt CtNt
(A.38)
where labor income now depends on the initial level of human capital Ht 1. The human capital
accumulation equation is assumed to be as in (33):
(Ht  Ht 1) + HHt 1 = F (Et)Ht 1 (A.39)
Linearizing the maximization problem as before, we get:
vt   v = Et
1X
s=0
s

pLLh
(1 + g)
bpLt+s + pKk(1 + g) (1 + n) bpKt+s   pCt cbpt+s + bt+s + rb(1 + g) (1 + n)brt+s

+
(1  ) + pK
(1 + g) (1 + n)
kbkt 1 + UL 1 + g
F 0(E)h
+
pLL
(1 + g)

hbht 1 (A.40)
where ht = HtXt and p
L
t =
PLt
P It
(notice that we do not normalize PLt by P
I
t Xt as we did in the previous
three sections of the appendix). The FOCs for human capital and labor, in normalized terms, are:
0 =  ULt
1 + g
F 0(E)ht 1
(A.41)
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#
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and
0 =  ULt +
tp
L
t ht 1
(1 + g)
(A.42)
while the FOCs for consumption, physical capital and bonds are still dened by equations (A.4),
(A.6) and (A.7).
Using the FOCs for physical capital and human capital evaluated in the steady state in (A.40)
and the log-linearized version of the budget constraint, we obtain:
vt   v = Et
1X
s=0
s
 
pCcbct+s + i^{t+s   pLLh
(1 + g)
bLt+s + bht+s 1+ pK
(1 + g) (1 + n)
kbkt+s 1
+


kbkt 1 +  1
1  

pLLh
(1 + g)
hbht 1 (A.43)
The rest of the proof parallels subsection subsection A.1 and yields equations (34) and (35) in
the text.
A.5 Simulations
In order to illustrate the quality of the approximation in Propositions 1, 1, 2 and 2, we consider
the standard RBC model augmented to take into account of public expenditure, distortionary and
lump-sum taxes and externalities from production.
There is a xed number of identical household with an innite time horizon. The representative
household chooses consumption, leisure and investments in capital and bonds to maximize the
following intertemporal utility function:
Wt = Et
1X
s=0
sCt+s
1 (L  Lt+s)
1 

(1 )
subject to the following budget constraint:
It +Bt =
 
1 + iBt

Bt 1 + PLt (1   t)Lt + PKt (1   t)Kt 1  t   Ct
In this model public expenditure is pure waste and can be nanced through an income tax (with
tax-rate  t) or a lump-sum tax (t). Thus, total public expenditure is:
CG;t = P
L
t  tLt + P
K
t  tKt 1 +t
The law of motion for capital is:
Kt = (1  )Kt 1 + It
There is a large number of rms which operate under perfect competition and are characterized
by the same Cobb-Douglas function:
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Yt = EtAtL
1 
t K

t 1
where At is the Harrod-neutral technology parameter while Et measures an externality that arises
from aggregate production:
Et = Y
1  1
e
t
In equilibrium, the national income account equation holds:
Yt = Ct + CG;t + It
There are three potential shocks in this economy to technology At, to the lump-sum tax, t;
and to the income tax rate,  t. The laws of motion of these variables are the following:
logAt = 1 logAt + "1t
t = (1  2)SS + 2t 1 + "2t
 t = (1  3)SS + 3 t 1 + "3t
The following table reports the calibration for the benchmark model:
 0.987
 1.1
1 
 1.78
 0.012
 0.4
e 2
1 = 2 = 3 0.95
SS 0.16
SS 0.29
sd("1) = sd("2) = sd("3) 0.0075
In the simulations illustrated in section 4, we have considered four special cases of this model:
1. Ramsey model ( = 1; e = 1;SS = 0; SS = 0)
2. RBC model (e = 1;SS = 0; SS = 0)
3. RBC model with public expenditure nanced by distortionary taxes (e = 1;SS = 0)
4. RBC model with public expenditure nanced by lump-sum taxes and externalities from pro-
duction (SS = 0)
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Table 1: Time Series Models for Productivity
Dependent variable: logPRt
CASE 1: Wasteful Government. Lump-Sum Taxes
Canada France Italy Japan Spain UK USA
log PR(t-1) 0.459 0.967 0.835 1.424 1.174 0.962 0.798
(0.195) (0.210) (0.153) (0.186) (0.199) (0.200) (0.135)
log PR(t-2) -0.287 -0.582 -0.393 -0.449
(0.204) (0.187) (0.195) (0.179)
Time 0.0018 0.0040 0.0011 0.0006 0.0013 0.0081 0.0028
(0.0007) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0026) (0.0018)
LM1(Prob>chi2) 0.191 0.130 0.444 0.960 0.338 0.450 0.124
CASE 2: Optimal Government. Distortionary Taxes
Canada France Italy Japan Spain UK USA
log PR(t-1) 0.689 1.107 0.874 1.468 1.388 1.104 0.801
(0.167) (0.202) (0.119) (0.184) (0.172) (0.196) (0.135)
log PR(t-2) -0.393 -0.591 -0.623 -0.491
(0.197) (0.186) (0.172) (0.182)
Time 0.0029 0.0044 0.0011 0.0013 0.0041 0.0080 0.0035
(0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0023)
LM1(Prob>chi2) 0.157 0.274 0.166 0.717 0.309 0.820 0.084
Note: Sample period: 1985-2005 (except Canada: 1985-2004).
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Table 2: Annual Average Log Change in Per-Capita Equivalent Consumption
Wasteful Spending Optimal Spending Wasteful Spending Optimal Spending
Lump-Sum Taxes Lump-Sum Taxes Distortionary Taxes Distortionary Taxes
Canada 0.013 0.014 0.021 0.023
France 0.026 0.031 0.026 0.031
Italy 0.018 0.020 0.021 0.023
Japan 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.030
Spain 0.021 0.030 0.030 0.040
UK 0.032 0.036 0.036 0.039
USA 0.025 0.026 0.029 0.030
Note: Sample period: 1985-2005 (except Canada: 1985-2004).
Table 3: Components of the Annual Log-Change in Per-Capita Equivalent Consumption
Wasteful Spending Wasteful Spending Optimal Spending
Lump-Sum Taxes Distortionary Taxes Distortionary Taxes
Fraction due to: Fraction due to: Fraction due to:
TFP Capital TFP Capital TFP Capital
Canada 0.445 0.555 0.658 0.342 0.690 0.310
France 0.830 0.170 0.827 0.173 0.857 0.143
Italy 0.659 0.341 0.707 0.293 0.724 0.276
Japan 0.429 0.571 0.559 0.441 0.661 0.339
Spain 0.512 0.488 0.663 0.337 0.747 0.253
UK 0.816 0.184 0.833 0.167 0.848 0.152
USA 0.830 0.170 0.852 0.148 0.858 0.142
Note: Sample period: 1985-2005 (except Canada: 1985-2004). TFP includes both expected present value and
expectation revision.
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Table 4: Annual Average Log-Change in Per-capita Consumption, GDP and Equivalent Consump-
tion
Consumption GDP Equiv. Cons. Equiv. Cons. Equiv. Cons.
Opt Gov, Dist Tax Opt Gov, Dist Tax Opt Gov, Dist Tax
(US dynamics) (No Leisure)
Canada 0.016 0.016 0.023 0.033 0.024
France 0.016 0.016 0.031 0.034 0.031
Italy 0.016 0.017 0.023 0.034 0.023
Japan 0.019 0.018 0.030 0.040 0.029
Spain 0.027 0.027 0.040 0.040 0.041
UK 0.024 0.030 0.039 0.035 0.039
USA 0.020 0.022 0.030 0.030 0.030
Note: Sample period: 1985-2005 (except Canada: 1985-2004).
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Table 5: Welfare Gap Relative to USA: 1985, 2005 and Average
Wasteful Spending Wasteful Spending Optimal Spending
Lump-Sum Taxes Distortionary Taxes Distortionary Taxes
PANEL A: 1985
Canada -0.256 -0.294 -0.295
France -0.069 -0.176 -0.165
Italy -0.368 -0.420 -0.437
Japan -0.511 -0.488 -0.471
Spain -0.327 -0.396 -0.414
UK -0.096 -0.182 -0.189
USA 0.000 0.000 0.000
PANEL B: 2005
Canada -0.407 -0.455 -0.451
France -0.078 -0.240 -0.213
Italy -0.569 -0.641 -0.664
Japan -0.540 -0.582 -0.526
Spain -0.396 -0.405 -0.362
UK 0.034 -0.068 -0.059
USA 0.000 0.000 0.000
PANEL C: average 1985-2005
Canada -0.328 -0.372 -0.373
France -0.065 -0.201 -0.181
Italy -0.445 -0.507 -0.529
Japan -0.498 -0.505 -0.468
Spain -0.348 -0.389 -0.375
UK -0.026 -0.120 -0.116
USA 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: estimates for Canada refer to 2004 and 1985-2004.
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Table 6: Components of Welfare Gap Relative to USA: 1985, 2005 and Average
Wasteful Spending Wasteful Spending Optimal Spending
Lump-Sum Taxes Distortionary Taxes Distortionary Taxes
Fraction due to: Fraction due to: Fraction due to:
TFP Capital TFP Capital TFP Capital
PANEL A: 1985
Canada 0.936 0.064 0.945 0.055 0.945 0.055
France 0.968 0.032 0.988 0.012 0.987 0.013
Italy 1.007 -0.007 1.006 -0.006 1.006 -0.006
Japan 1.091 -0.091 1.096 -0.096 1.099 -0.099
Spain 0.855 0.145 0.880 0.120 0.885 0.115
UK 0.379 0.621 0.672 0.328 0.683 0.317
PANEL B: 2005
Canada 0.900 0.100 0.911 0.089 0.910 0.090
France 0.421 0.579 0.811 0.189 0.788 0.212
Italy 0.972 0.028 0.975 0.025 0.976 0.024
Japan 1.065 -0.065 1.060 -0.060 1.067 -0.067
Spain 0.898 0.102 0.900 0.100 0.888 0.112
UK - - -0.079 1.079 -0.233 1.233
PANEL C: average 1985-2005
Canada 0.915 0.085 0.925 0.075 0.925 0.075
France 0.666 0.334 0.891 0.109 0.879 0.121
Italy 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.001 0.999 0.001
Japan 1.115 -0.115 1.113 -0.113 1.122 -0.122
Spain 0.887 0.113 0.899 0.101 0.895 0.105
UK -1.513 2.513 0.448 0.552 0.443 0.557
Note: estimates for Canada refer to 2004 and 1985-2004.
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Table 7: Per-Capita GDP, Consumption and Equivalent Consumption relative to USA: 1985, 2005
and Average
Consumption GDP Equiv. Cons. Equiv. Cons. Equiv. Cons.
Opt Gov, Dist Tax Opt Gov, Dist Tax Opt Gov, Dist Tax
(US dynamics) (No Leisure)
PANEL A: 1985
Canada -0.179 -0.106 -0.295 -0.188 -0.300
France -0.285 -0.250 -0.165 -0.190 -0.184
Italy -0.378 -0.287 -0.437 -0.315 -0.496
Japan -0.434 -0.211 -0.471 -0.505 -0.449
Spain -0.624 -0.570 -0.414 -0.522 -0.446
UK -0.306 -0.304 -0.189 -0.196 -0.195
USA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PANEL B: 2005
Canada -0.324 -0.177 -0.451 -0.353 -0.455
France -0.401 -0.317 -0.213 -0.226 -0.240
Italy -0.501 -0.370 -0.664 -0.553 -0.719
Japan -0.456 -0.261 -0.526 -0.487 -0.531
Spain -0.527 -0.419 -0.362 -0.423 -0.376
UK -0.190 -0.219 -0.059 -0.203 -0.061
USA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
PANEL C: average 1985-2005
Canada -0.248 -0.163 -0.373 -0.259 -0.377
France -0.338 -0.265 -0.181 -0.166 -0.203
Italy -0.396 -0.278 -0.529 -0.304 -0.579
Japan -0.391 -0.176 -0.468 -0.403 -0.460
Spain -0.537 -0.447 -0.375 -0.405 -0.397
UK -0.220 -0.251 -0.116 -0.121 -0.120
USA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Note: estimates for Canada refer to 2004 and 1985-2004.
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Table 8: Welfare Gap Relative to US and its Components in 2005: Extended Sample of Countries
Welfare Fraction due to Welfare Fraction due to:
Gap TFP Capital Gap TFP Capital
Luxembourg 0.507 1.035 -0.035
USA 0.000   Iran -1.835 0.701 0.299
Australia -0.150 0.830 0.170 Mexico -1.965 0.777 0.223
Singapore -0.162 0.195 0.805 China -1.970 0.694 0.306
Norway -0.191 1.317 -0.317 Jamaica -2.048 0.823 0.177
UK -0.226 -0.013 1.013 Malaysia -2.185 0.837 0.163
Sweden -0.450 0.837 0.163 Costa Rica -2.238 0.791 0.209
Belgium -0.468 0.851 0.149 Thailand -2.258 0.747 0.253
Finland -0.476 0.735 0.265 Panama -2.470 0.809 0.191
Netherlands -0.496 0.822 0.178 Tunisia -2.484 0.750 0.250
South Korea -0.509 0.829 0.171 Argentina -2.578 0.842 0.158
Cyprus -0.518 0.443 0.557 Guatemala -2.706 0.680 0.320
Denmark -0.529 0.790 0.210 Egypt -2.728 0.696 0.304
Austria -0.538 0.773 0.227 Venezuela -2.744 0.780 0.220
France -0.542 0.704 0.296 Sri Lanka -2.746 0.770 0.230
Canada -0.565 0.855 0.145 Brazil -2.920 0.804 0.196
Hong Kong -0.589 0.823 0.177 India -2.978 0.673 0.327
Spain -0.590 0.730 0.270 Indonesia -3.071 0.748 0.252
Japan -0.614 0.964 0.036 Peru -3.152 0.834 0.166
Israel -0.617 0.835 0.165 El Salvador -3.335 0.798 0.202
Switzerland -0.648 0.926 0.074 Syria -3.452 0.744 0.256
Portugal -0.701 0.558 0.442 Ecuador -3.480 0.844 0.156
New Zealand -0.728 0.870 0.130 Colombia -3.683 0.833 0.167
Ireland -0.779 0.887 0.113 Honduras -3.764 0.799 0.201
Romania -0.936 0.644 0.356 Philippines -3.841 0.822 0.178
Italy -1.068 0.846 0.154 Pakistan -4.034 0.760 0.240
Trinidad and Tobago -1.142 0.754 0.246 Bolivia -4.267 0.834 0.166
Uruguay -1.516 0.672 0.328 Lesotho -4.336 0.795 0.205
Chile -1.604 0.759 0.241 Morocco -4.417 0.807 0.193
Barbados -1.630 0.890 0.110 Uganda -4.426 0.727 0.273
Turkey -1.662 0.622 0.378 Togo -4.565 0.760 0.240
Botswana -1.767 0.791 0.209 Paraguay -5.418 0.874 0.126
Note: estimates for Canada refer to 2004.
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Figure 1: Numerical Experiments: Impulse Responses for log Equivalent Consumption
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Figure 2: Numerical Experiments: Cross-Country Gaps for log Equivalent Consumption
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Figure 3: Within CountryWelfare Changes (in log Equivalent Consumption): Wasteful Government
Spending and Lump Sum Taxes
Figure 4: Within Country Welfare Changes (in log Equivalent Consumption): Optimal Government
Spending and Distortionary Taxes
Figure 5: Within Country Welfare Changes with Human Capital (in log Equivalent Consumption):
Optimal Government Spending and Distortionary Taxes
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Figure 6: Cross Country Welfare Comparisons with US Preferences (log Equivalent Consumption
Gaps vis-à-vis the US): Wasteful Government Spending and Lump Sum Taxes
Figure 7: Cross Country Welfare Comparisons with US Preferences (log Equivalent Consumption
Gaps vis-à-vis the US): Optimal Government Spending and Distortionary Taxes
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Figure 8: Cross Country Welfare Comparisons with French Preferences(log Equivalent Consump-
tion Gaps vis-à-vis the US): Optimal Government Spending and Distortionary Taxes
Figure 9: Cross Country Welfare Comparisons with US Preferences and Human Capital (log Equiv-
alent Consumption Gaps vis-à-vis the US): Optimal Government Spending and Distortionary Taxes
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